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The study is a contextual account of various factors that facilitate and promote the 
continued dominance of the ‘Number gangs’ prevalent in many (if not most) South 
African prisons. Even though there is a substantial amount of factors that critically 
influence and sustain the South African prison gangs, this paper will focus upon a 
few of these influences. An emergent sentiment from exponents within these gangs, 
and supporting academic literature both argue that these dominant inmate factions 
are now adapting their mythical credo so as to remain an informal power-player 
within the scope of a failing South African prison administration. From a managerial 
perspective, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) is often found 
attempting to give meaningful accounts of itself amidst its failed efforts to transform 
both itself and the South African prison administration. The policy legislation and 
administration of DCS thus also contribute to prison gang prominence. The study 
shows that DCS has embraced a policy of harsher penality, although its official 
position is that it is transforming into an administration that is focused upon human 
rights. This paper will thus give brief insight into the prison gangs’ organization and 
operations, and then focus upon various contexts within which the Number gangs 
continue to be pervasive, especially due to changing prison administrative policy (or 
lack thereof) and due to new adaptive strategy employed by gangs to make 



















Economic disparity left as a legacy of apartheid has resulted in extreme poverty and 
soaring crime rates that leave many South African communities dislocated.1 This 
study gives a descriptive exposition of some of the economic, socio-cultural, and 
political dynamics that define South African prison gangs and inadvertently promote 
their position as unofficial policy-makers within the South African penal landscape. 
It will give a brief account of the origins of prison gangs and expose some features 
which influence its daily operation both directly and indirectly. To this end, it will 
look at contexts that are dynamic within the operation of prison gangs that permit 
them to adapt to the South African prison institution and all its prescriptions. The 
prison gangs have evolved to hugely impact on gangs outside of the prison 
environment. In turn, many outside gangs have shown a dynamic ability to generate 
their identity and operations into that of super-gangs (gangs that have grown 
exponentially economically through their various illicit dealing, and now have 
millions in capital to support their criminal (and legitimate) activities).2 The paper 
will address such contexts as an extension of prison gangs’ adaptive ability within 
changing contemporary settings that influence prison gang dominance in South 
African prisons. Other examples cited by the work also include high recidivism rates, 
and socio-cultural and political factors inherited from both the colonial and apartheid 
legacies thatare seen to influence all influence gang dominance. The paper will also 
argue that there are institutional and managerial influences that propagate prison 
gang dominance. Some of the many administrative failures of DCS and its stunted 
transformation and unsuccessful follow-through will be examined. The study will 
argue that DCS’s inability to transform from its apartheid-based predecessor that 
relied heavily on penality instead of humanitarian-based prison reform also largely 
contribute to the gangs’ power base within the prison management infrastructure. 
This landscape is a battleground with many combatants, all (it would seem) with 
their own agenda. The result is a prison population that is exceeding critical mass, a 
scenario showing most prison exponents to come from underprivileged backgrounds, 
where gangsterism and prison-time is a reality for many youths.3 This presents fertile 
                                                
1  Standing (2003) 5. 
2  Standing (2006) 11. 




grounds for research that may harvest far-reaching conclusions about the socio-




The various literatures were chosen to compliment the paper’s theme which is to 
spotlight the various contexts that gave birth to and promote prison gang dominance. 
Given the devastation elicited by South Africa’s colonial and apartheid legacy, the 
literature review includes an examination of the socio-economic and political factors 
that influence prison gangs. Some of the literatures were more especially focused in 
the Western Cape: 
 
South African prison gangs have (since their inception) asserted that they are the 
product of discriminatory laws and that their continued pervasiness is contingent 
upon them (prison gangs) opposing the apparatus that oppressed them (notably the 
colonial and apartheid legacies.4 Golden asserts that the colonial legacy coupled with 
the psychological disparity spawned by apartheid, caused an almost inexhaustible 
practice of discriminatory and damaging racial designations when interpreting the 
structure of South African society, since an internalization of these racial foundations 
has occurred within many South African institutions.5 The South African political 
discourse is thus an essential theoretical component if examination of prison gang 
influences is endeavoured. 6 Thus, when examining the Cape Flats it is found to be 
impoverished in both infrastructure and income. This is testament to the legacy of 
apartheid that focused most of the state’s funds into ‘white’ areas. Depressing social 
features include the adverse effects of drug dependency, domestic violence, family 
fragmentation, high levels of inter-personal conflict7. The high levels of violence 
have resulted in many areas being considered out of bounds for non-residents due to 
street gangs and the threat of violent assault and hijacking. Failed police methods 
have seen authorities increasingly resorting to punitive measures to control areas 
deemed ‘ungovernable’. The most salient result of this been the dramatic swelling of 
the criminal justice system, where prison authorities reveal that Cape Town’s prisons 
                                                
4  Steinberg (2004) 7. 
5  Golden (1987) 45. 
6  Super (2010) 26. 




contain almost double the population it is designed to hold.8 A large number of 
young ‘coloured’ people living on the Cape Flats experience time in prisons or in 
reformatories.9 The socio-economic impact of this situation is alarming. What is 
more, in impoverished areas that have been neglected by both capital and state, the 
criminal economy can still develop social dimensions.  
 
Gangsterism and organized crime may thus represent a rational response of survival 
and resistance. The criminal economy is substantial on the Cape Flats, where its 
various boundaries blur with other socio-economic activities and it involves 
thousands of people.10 Inside this dynamic, it can be found that prominent members 
of gangs (my research suggests a strong positive correlation between gangs and 
organized crime, in that they are growth shoots on the same branch, proverbially 
speaking) receive community support. This is what is regarded as a social 
contradiction of organized crime.11 It is found that organized crime primarily finds 
community support because gang leaders provide support to communities. Gang 
leaders also espouse community governance and acts of philanthropy, in ways that 
the state fails to or is unable to. These communities and gangs are intricately 
enmeshed in the belief of common identity (of being ‘coloured’). Standing argues 
that crime thus acts as both a creator and destroyer of communities in that criminal 
activity advances a paradoxical source of both decay and survival/defense.12 Crime 
bosses are philanthropic and support communities financially whilst at the same time 
they are also regarded as the source of drug trade within these communities and are 
equally abhorred for the damage that they sow through their illegal activities that 
lead to many broken families and increased criminal behaviour. The scene depicts a 
dysfunctional state of affairs where lack of state support (failed service delivery and 
stunted transformation of the criminal justice system) leads to communities having 
more faith in prominent leaders of organized crime above respect for the law.13 
 
This complex web of crime outlines a criminal agenda that actively operates and 
colludes both inside and outside prison. Pinnock’s study of street gangs and state-
                                                
8  Giffard (1997) 19. 
9  Pinnock (1997) 12. 
10 Standing op cit (1) 22. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Standing (2006) op cit (2) 23. 




control briefly exposes a correlation between gangs inside and outside of prison.14 
The study argues that a Cape Town based gang – The Mongrels – have reproduced a 
street version of the 26s prison gang. This was made possible in the early 1980s by 
gang members being jailed for offences, assimilating rank within the prison gangs 
and adopting a diluted version of this prison gang lore into gang foundations when 
they (Mongrel gang members) leave prison.15  
 
Steinberg asserts that South Africa’s re-integration into the neo-capitalist economy 
affected the domestic drug market, which in turn greatly affected the way that gangs 
operated.16 The new designer drugs that flooded the streets brought more substantial 
economic power and influence to the street gangs. When these gang leaders found 
themselves in prison they were vulnerable in the face of many soldiers from rival 
street gangs. To this end they aspired to make the prison landscape resemble the 
streets as much as possible. This implied compromising and (in many ways) 
distorting the institution that is the Number gangs.17 
 
Twentieth century South Africa bore witness to a host of socio-political movements 
that will never find a place in the vernacular of political orthodoxy. These 
movements (politically focused and every bit anti-social) were both exacerbated by 
and a result of the psychological damage inflicted by the South African 
industrialization process18. Prison gangs are akin to this as they are decades old, 
dedicated to their own brand of politics, and at the same time, they are devastatingly 
pathological. Prison gang dominance has been an albatross around DCS’s neck, and 
both management and policy makers have had more failures than successes in their 
attempt to remedy the situation.19 According to Muntingh, contemporary trends 
regarding the treatment of prisoners tend to embrace a stance that is more punitive.20 
Political change and the advent of democracy brought about dramatic changes in the 
philosophy and law relating to imprisonment in South Africa in the past decade. The 
legacy of apartheid left the new regime with a DCS that inherited a deeply rooted 
                                                
14  Pinnock (1997) 24. 
15  Pinnock (1987) 6. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Standing op cit (2) 26. 
19  Super opcit (2) 201. 




militaristic tradition, a closed-management style, and a vociferous trade union 
membership.21 Prior to 1994 prisons in South Africa were structured to focus mainly 
on the safe custody of prisoners with rehabilitation being completely ignored. 
Muntingh22 asserts that transformation in this scenario should therefore be seen as 
being part of a broader political process, part of a series of changes throughout 
society, not just that of an institution.23  
 
The various literatures speak toward the findings of this thesis and all contribute as 
influences for prison gang dominance within South African prison wasteland. 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The Number gangs, previously renowned for its clandestine practices and active only 
within the realm of prisons, have evolved into an organization that operates outside 
the ambit of prison and its accompanying restrictions and thus begs dedicated study 
as to what influences sustain this phenomenon.24 Schurink shows the Numbers gangs 
to be the most prevalent in South African prisons, with the 28 gang dominating the 
terrain followed by the 26s gang.25 The previously powerful 27s gang has become 
diluted and almost defunct in many prisons. These gangs are all ordered in a pseudo-
military organization.26 Schurink argues that exponents of the Numbers gangs see 
themselves as being Wetslaner (law breakers/makers) of South African prison life.27 
The Numbers gangs, already structurally complex, have undergone a functional 
evolution, enabling a system that facilitates effective and cohesive functioning of the 
respective gangs.28 The Number gang’s parliament or high court (called the Twelve 
Points) is exposed as an efficient and deliberate council which presides over gang 
culture in its entirety: its sphere of influence ranging from recruitment, procurement, 
training, initiation, security, policy implementation, assassinations, etc.  
 
                                                
21  Sloth-Nielsen (2005) 43. 
22  Muntingh op cit (1) 62. 
23  Giffard op cit (1) 99. 
24  Steinberg op cit (3) 76. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Schurink & Lötter  (1986) 29. 
27  Ibid. 




The Schurink study mentioned two pivotal theoretical foundations important to this 
dissertation: First, it is theorised that the dynamics between the relationship between 
the Numbers gangs and the prison authorities are contingent upon the prevailing 
prison conditions (the proverbial lekker bandiet policy), that is, if prisoners are 
treated with contempt the Numbers gangs will do all in their power to make prison 
governance a difficult goal; 29 Second, the study posits that the influence of outside 
gangs is becoming substantial to the extent that the outside gangs, when inducted 
into the prison gangs, are diluting the Numbers gang structure and policy. The 
outside influence questions the importance of the Numbers gang mythology. The 
organization of these super-gangs infiltrating the Numbers gangs (amidst resistance 
from the established patriarchs of the prison gangs) rattles the foundations of the 
Numbers and slowly changes the nature of prison gang culture in South Africa (and 
abroad).30 This paradigm is referred to as die nommer is dronk (the Number is 
drunk).  
 
The overall theoretical analysis is still dynamic and relevant as it focuses on the form 
and functioning of the prison gangs and exposes the often-negotiated community 
between gang and prison administration, and the subsequent influences outside the 




Within the Cape Flats there is a further racial, economic and spatial segregation – 
there are the more populous ‘coloured’ communities (an ambiguous catch-all term 
for lighter skinned mixed race people devised by the architects of apartheid) and the 
less numerous, but more densely populated African communities31. The ‘coloured’ 
identity has its foundations in colonial and apartheid influenced objectives, aimed at 
segregating all people of colour even further through psychological othering. This 
process is aligned to colonial attitudes of ‘divide and conquer’ and served as an 
easier means to acquire land in South Africa.32  
 
                                                
29  Ibid 
30  Ibid.  
31  Stone (1991) 20. 




Gangsterism has become enmeshed with the ‘coloured’ identity and in many ways 
this stereotype is still one that creates racial divide in South African society. Many 
‘coloureds’ are judged because of accompanying generalizations especially the 
gangsterism element being linked to prison and given the prison demographic 
(previously advantaged persons dominate prison population numbers). Given that 
much of its grouping comes from impoverished communities also inflates the 
stereotype. Any attempt to gain insight into gangsterism, which has become a crucial 
part of life in South Africa given the high crime rate (and the strong correlation 
between gangsterism and crime), can contribute to a better understanding of South 
Africa’s socio-political strife33. In an attempt to curtail the potency and pervasive 
nature of these racial biases and psychological internalizations, this paper will 
qualify racially designated terms such as ‘coloured’, ‘black’, and ‘white’ in italics. I 
take into account, however, the fact that these racial designations are socialized and 
that identities have since been constructed accordingly given that they have been 
used for such a long time. To this end, internalized racial stereotypes combined with 
a dedicated socialization policy, creates a cultural dynamics that creates a new 
identity for example the coloured identity, that is both accepted in South African 
culture and adamantly and proudly championed by so called coloured peoples. 
 
This rhetoric is in the same way applied to identity construction within South African 
prisons. The Number gangs, namely the 26s, 27s, and 28s are designated an italic. 
The gangs make use of a variant slang employed to confused authorities and those 
suspected of eve’s dropping. All the words used by the gangs to describe their 
operation and dynamics are also written in italics, given that they are a hybrid for of 
the Afrikaans language combined with another African language (Zulu, Pondo, etc.). 
All subjects that volunteered to be interviewed were given aliases so as to protect 
their identities and their aliases are also thus recorded in italic. Conceptually, interest 
is in the subject matter is rooted in the national predicament in South Africa that 
shows communities in disparity, overwhelmed by poverty and in the grips of crime. 
The scenario breeds fertile grounds for violence and intolerance.  
 
 
                                                




(2) Research Design 
The paper was originally designed to support a qualitative enquiry already approved 
by the DCS whereby I would interview prison inmates regarding the dynamics 
influencing prison gangs. At the time of my Honours thesis write-up, I was arrested 
and imprisoned without bail for twelve days. This unfortunate state of affairs 
somehow turned out to be a blessing in disguise to me as I had tried unsuccessfully 
to get authorization from the DCS to conduct interviews within various prisons so as 
to substantiate my study concerning gang culture and the Cape Coon Carnival. My 
lock-up time provided me with an invaluable spinal tap into both prison gang culture 
and contemporary gang culture as a whole. The otherwise tightly-locked prison 
institution was now conveniently open to me to be researched, given a careful 
negotiation with the policy makers within the prison confines, and this authority was 
not limited to only DCS personnel – the prison gangs played an integral part in 
prison culture, I had learnt. The twelve-day incarceration, limited in that the charges 
brought against me were dropped on the thirteenth day, demanded that I utilize my 
imprisonment time productively. Negotiating the difficult terrain that imprisonment 
brings, I used my time to secure as many interviews with gang members as my 
prisoner status permitted. Twenty interviews were conducted inside Goodwood 
prison (32 interviews were conducted outside the confines of prison). 
 
The Honours thesis showed a distinct correlation with gangs outside of prison itself. 
The study, however, also unearthed an array of features to gang culture (both inside 
and outside prison) that showed this subject to still be under-researched and thus 
prompted me to further investigate this paradigm. As I was detained as a trial 
awaiting prisoner, I was thus given a first-hand look into the dynamics that informs 
the existence of the Number gangs. I conducted interviews without the consent of the 
DCS in an official sense. As a trial awaiting prisoner I was free to speak with 
whomever I wanted (and I could address whichever subject matter I so chose). The 
DCS administrative staff knew that I was interviewing prisoners, but as I noticed first 
hand, they gave scant regard for administrative protocols, and were self-serving to 
corrupt ends. As an inmate I found my very existence contingent upon the 
prescriptive detail that prisoners adhere to everyday. The study employed a 
qualitative research approach. The prison interviews necessitated a combination of 




gangs illicit both philosophical and experiential relevance. My knowledge of the 
Number gangs’ organisation and operation greatly helped my prison interviews. I 
informed interviewees that it was a research paper for the University of Cape Town 
and that the study was in no way aligned to the Department of Correctional Services. 
Although I was armed with an interview schedule, I found that all interviewees were 
so excited just to contribute to this study that I often encouraged the interview format 
to become less formal enabling subjects to speak freely. In so doing, I found the 
participants almost recklessly revealing the nature of the Number gangs unto me. 
Negotiating the difficult terrain that imprisonment brings, I used my time to secure as 
many interviews with gang members as my prisoner status permitted. Hereafter my 
research focused on a high-ranking member of the 28s prison gang called Sling 
Blade, who agreed to be interviewed by me regarding prison gang structure, function 
and operation.34 He agreed to give insight into prison gang influences, at least to his 
knowledge. He had been a prisoner in South African prisons for every decade since 
the 1960s. He was thus a stalwart within the 28s gang since 1968 up and until present 
day.  
 
The study would not be credible in its pursuit of prison gang influences if it did not 
engage with the relevant governmental polices related to prisons and also DCS and 
its administrative path. To this end my interviewees were limited in their scope as 
they could only give subjective insight into prison managerial practices. The study 
thus tackles prison administration and policy reform (or attempts at reform), as an 
instrument of influence to prison gang dominance, by analyzing the respective 




The subjects were 52 coloured males ranging from 18 to 78 years old. The interviews 
were conducted in English but participants were encouraged to speak in their chosen 
language so as that they could speak freely and give a comprehensive contribution to 
the study. No time limit was assigned to any of the interviews. The prison interviews 
that had time limits were dictated by the degree of ‘exercise time’ I was afforded as a 
                                                




trial-awaiting prisoner – my interviews were not conducted with the authority and 
consent of the DCS. The participants were all informed of the aims of the thesis and 
all volunteered to individually contribute their knowledge regarding the subject 
matter. The participants, more especially the prison interviewees, were surprisingly 
excited to contribute to this written work.  I recall, at the time, interpreting this 
enthusiasm to participate in the research as possibly being an escape for the 
immediate confinement of prison life. Thirty-two of the participants were civilians 
who had previously spent time in prison and were either active gang members or had 
previously belonged to a gang. The remaining 20 subjects were trial awaiting 
prisoners detained at Goodwood prison. My go-between and translator, who himself 
agreed to be interviewed, aided my interpretation of the interviews conducted with 
the civilian participants. Much of gang communication is embedded in the hybrid 
prison language (called sabela). My go-between is fluent in this vernacular and his 
insight into gangs both inside and outside of prison was vital in translating and 
analysing the data gathered from the in-depth interviews. The prison interviewees 
were all members of the Number gangs and they all, in turn, shared a gang affiliation 
outside of prison. My insight into the Number gangs served as go-between and 
translator for the duration of the interviews conducted in prison. As I have conducted 
the civilian interviews first, and through an unfortunate (or fortunate?) set of 
circumstances conducted the prison interview thereafter, I again turned to my go-
between to aid with translating the prison interviews when I was released from 
custody.  
 
The prison interviews were used to validate and reference the propositions of Sling 
Blade, the battle-scarred and prison-hardened exponent of prison gang ethos. My 
interviews conducted with Sling Blade happened at his convenience and interview 
times were often contingent upon his court appearances as he was (at the time) out on 
bail for charges related to murder. Sling Blade volunteered to be a subject of my 
research after my father suggested it to him. My father had met him in prison years 
before, where they had forged a strong fellowship. My father, having also decided to 
become a prison gang member, relied upon its strict sense of loyalty when addressing 
Sling Blade regarding the interviews. It could thus be said that Sling Blade agreed to 
be interviewed because my father told him that the interviews would be necessary 




valuable insight into prison gang dynamics. All of my interviews confirmed his 
propositions. Sling Blade made an attractive subject as he had spent most of his life 
in South African prisons and had worked his way up the 28s rank and file to become 
both feared and revered within prison gang settings. He claimed to be an assassin 
outside of prison. Many people that I had interviewed (including high-ranking gang 
members) confirmed his proposition, as did my go-between. While I interviewed 
Sling Blade, I leant that he was recruiting 28s outside prison while he was out on bail 
for attempted murder charges. Sling Blade gives a vivid account of his life within the 
Number gangs and his narrative is one riddled with emotion and conviction. As 
mentioned, I used the prison interviews (coupled with the outside interviews) to 
substantiate the claims made by Sling Blade. I found this approach necessary, given 
that a subject’s account of a life premised in a mythology is often difficult to validate 
and easy to conflate. What makes Sling Blade’s interviews even more compelling is 




The study has relied heavily on interviews conducted both inside and outside of 
prison as part of an Honours dissertation.35 The approximately fifty persons (thirty 
civilians that all were previously jailed and participated in a prison Coon Carnival, 
and twenty prisoners incarcerated at Goodwood prison) had all generously agreed to 
be interviewed and have their memories, opinions, and experiences recorded and 
shared as part of this thesis. They have relayed their history with, and, except in two 
instances where the interviewees asked to remain anonymous, they were all delighted 
at the prospect of having their names aligned with both (1) a university thesis, and 
(2) a university thesis concerning the gangs. The zeal with which the proposed 
interviews were received was interpreted (to a degree) with suspicion, as the prison 
Numbers (gangs) are notorious for their closed ranks and ironclad secrecy regarding 
their operations. When quoting from these interviews, which were conducted in 
English in the presence (for many interviewees) of my go-between who translated 
the much-used Cape Town dialect of Afrikaans, I have attempted to preserve as 
much of the original language and oral style as possible. A go-between also 
                                                




translated the prison gang language, called ‘sabela’which is a hybrid language 
created to confuse authorities and keep them in the dark regarding communications 
between the prison gangs.36 The prison language is highlighted by the use of inverted 
commas, italics or capital letters. The prison interviews, although structured to 
empower the Coon Carnival base Honours thesis yielded much more than its 
projected outcomes – the interviewees showed a tendency to give in-depth answers 
that gave insight into the inner workings of the gangs themselves.37 I permitted them 
to speak freely, enjoying the detailed access into the still-today heavily vanguarded 
prison gang doctrine. 
 
As earlier mentioned, the limited and often prejudiced accounts that I received from 
my interviewee-sample regarding prison reform and administration, demanded that I 
tackle the relevant legislation head-on and also analyze the relevant studies that had 
already engaged with the subject matter. 
 
(5) Interview Schedule 
Much of prison happenings remain unrecorded and if a study is to be objective, it 
must account for the possible degree of fiction yielded from interviews, especially 
when the subjects rely solely on their memories as a source for factual recall. The 
study used two different question scales as a means to elicit subject consistency from 
responses given by participants. It was important to set an interview question scale as 
prison gangs’ ethos, ‘coloured identity,’ and all the other components related to gang 
dynamics tends to generate answers from interviewees that strays from the subject 
matter. The first scale was composed in collaboration with Mr. Mervin Mathis, the 
C.E.O. one of the Cape Coon Carnival companies. Mr. Mathis is knowledgeable and 
influential in Coon carnival (including prison Coon carnival) and has an extensive 
background in gangsterism, including the fact that he himself has a ranking position 
with the ‘26s’ prison gang.38 The second question scale was drafted inside 
Goodwood Prison and carried the essence of the first question set, but was amended 
so as to secure honest responses from the inmates; it was also designed to put the 
prison inmate at ease with the nature of questioning (given that none of them had 
                                                
36  Steinberg op cit (5) 87. 
37  Skywalker op cit (1) 17.  




been interviewed in their lives before!) and with the interview process itself. The 
question sets provide a skeleton for the interview itself. As a Dictaphone was used to 
record the civilian interviews, I allowed the interviewees to speak as much as 
possible, interrupting their responses only when I felt that they were straying from 
the subject matter. The inmate interviews were not audio-recorded but they were also 
afforded the same freedom to talk of their experiences and understandings of the 
subject matter. The appendix illustrates a copy of both these question sets. 
 
(6) Use of Interview Schedule 
(6.1) Negotiating Access for Civilian Interviews 
Mr. Mathis arranged the civilian interviews as per my request. He provided a list of 
possible candidates; he also referenced each candidate interviewee according to 
stature in both gang and coon societies. I selected interviewees according to the 
degree of influence that they shared in gangs. All the candidates presented to me had 
previously spent time in prison for some particular offence. Interviews were 
conducted in various locations ranging from my car, an interviewees’ home, and the 
interviewees themselves selected the interview locations. Mr. Mathis told the 
interviewees that I was his son and that I was doing research on the prevalence of 
prison Coon carnivals and the various factors that motivate its existence. The 
interviewees received no compensation for their input and all relayed an eagerness 
and pride in the fact that they could somehow contribute to the study. I was guided 
by my go-between not to ask specific questions regarding the prison number gangs, 
especially not to pose the question, ‘Are you a number in the prison gangs?’ He 
warned that this would compromise the interview since ‘only a number can ask a 
number that question…’ My translator was illustrating the powerful hold that the 
subscriptions of the gang foundations have over individuals even outside of prison. I 
tested this theory while conducting an interview at the interviewees’ home. The 
interviewee responded in Afrikaans, ‘…maar hy praat mos nou vannie Nommer. Jy 
weet mos ons praat nie vannie Nommer nie…’39 The interviewee proceeded by 
leaving the room and the interview ended. 
 
(6.2) Negotiating Access for Prison Interviews 
                                                




With regards to my personal safety, the prison interviews were more intense than the 
civilian interviews as I was forced to assimilate an alpha-male type character in order 
to survive my stay at Goodwood prison. The prison itself is a hive of corruption and 
misadministration. My 24 years experience in martial arts afforded me some degree 
of slack in that I continued my intense training schedule within prison walls and with 
prisoners and warders alike being an audience, my commitment to martial arts in 
many ways left me clear of being a target for violence or bullying of any kind. The 
prison staff instructed me not to impart any of my knowledge in martial arts to the 
rest of the prison population in fear of reprisals where prisoners would use such skill 
against them in times of violent protest. The prison gangs, at the same time, sent 
scouts to ensure that I was not forming a vierde kamp40. The various gang scouts 
approached me to ‘put me at their gate’ – in some way viewing my exercise as a way 
in which I was strengthening myself to join and empower any one of the prison 
gangs. This process they referred to as ‘hy maak hom sterk vir die nommer.’41 
Befriending the most senior gang members served my study well as it allowed for 
easy access interviews. I afforded every prisoner the dignity of being called ‘Mr.’ 
even if they had only given me their first name when we were introduced. Thus 
being introduced to a man known as ‘No Fear’, I immediately addressed him as ‘Mr. 
No Fear’. I found that such shows of respect softened the prisoners’ resolve and they 
immediately revealed more personal aspects of their identities to me42.  
 
After obtaining clearance from the highest-ranking gang members, I scanned the 
communal cells asking every prisoner if they knew of the prison Coon Carnival and 
if they would be willing to be interviewed. Albeit that a prison Coon Carnival was 
the primary theme, the interviews elicited much more insight into prison gang 
operations.43 After securing the candidate interviewees, I arranged a time for the 
interview and venue with the said prisoner. Most interviews were conducted in the 
courtyard during ‘exercise’ time; I would, for the most, isolate us in a corner so as 
not to be disturbed, as the courtyard is public space for all prisoners and warders. 
Some interviews, especially those with high-ranking gang members, were conducted 
in that prisoner’s communal living cell.  
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The interviews were interrupted on some occasions: on one occasion a senior warder, 
who had arrived at work late approached me for a telephone card. Telephone phone-
card cards are trade-worthy assets in prison and well sought after items. I told the 
warder that my talk-time vouchers are to be used to contact my legal council and 
cannot be wasted. Within an hour five gang members interrupted an interview that I 
was conducting to demand a phone-card. I gave them one that had two rands on it; I 
had hidden the rest on my person. They left after threatening to take my notebook, in 
which I recorded all my interviews. When I returned to my cell later that afternoon, it 
had been ransacked and all my previously recorded interview notes had been stolen. 
A non-gang inmate (called a frans) told me that the warder was in cahoots with the 
gang members and felt insulted by my earlier comments. The warder had thus sent 
the gang members to loot my cell. I had pre-empted such a response and in 
preparation had devised a simple abbreviation system that encrypted my notes. The 
fact that I was studying the Number gangs was dangerous and all safety measures 
had to be put in place so as not to compromise my life. These gangs are an integral 
part of prison life and their ways were protected from outside influence by a code of 
conduct and a sworn oath of silence, compromise of which is punishable with a death 
sentence meted out by the prison gang council. I was forced to hide my notes and 
smuggle them out of prison via my university supervisors that came to visit me, my 
family, and mostly I recited them daily so as to commit them to my long-term 
memory. When I was released from prison, I immediately penned the interview 
detail that was too dangerous too records within the confines of prison. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
Limitations to the study are rooted in the fact that only fifty interviews were 
conducted and this makes it difficult to generalize conclusions from it, given the 
small research sample. The esprit de corps evidenced within the ranks of prison gang 
members make it extremely difficult for members to be encouraged to compromise 
the ‘silence sworn’ to their gang ethic and give an account of their gang culture. The 
study had to contend with the fact that interviewees may have embellished their 
accounts in order to elevate their standing and contribution to the study. The lack of 
literature to substantiate gang culture (including its vagueness in the public domain) 




Time constraints as a limitation to the interview schedule did not deter subjects, who 
preferred to speak without being interrupted. I used my mandate as researcher to 
‘direct’ the interviews whenever I felt that it strayed too far from the research topic. 
Albeit that the then focal point was Coon Carnival dynamics both inside and outside 
prison, I found that my subjects were willing to speak on matters related to gang 
culture without being prompted to do so. As this was unprecedented, given that gang 
structure and operation is a secretive and powerful socialization both inside and 
outside prison, I was intrigued to elicit as much intelligence from the interviewees as 
possible. I had to double-check certain questions with different interviewees so as to 
confirm that I was being given an accurate account or if I was being bamboozled. My 
experience as a researcher nagged me to account for participant ego and a possible 
tendency to conflate scenarios and thus taint the credibility of data elicited from the 
interviews. I did all my capacity to utilise my time spent in prison in a way so as to 
get the truest account of the world of the Wetslaners (another name for the Number 
gangs, literally meaning law-makers).44 My observational study was initiated so as to 
gain a more accurate perspective of the prison life dynamic which included a study 
of the behaviour and movements of many prisoners and prison officials. 
 
As all my interviewees were biased and expressed negative views about DCS and 
governmental policy related to prisons, their insight into the matter limited my 
research. I was forced to look at literature regarding South African prison reform and 
analyze its impact on prison gangs and the prison population as a whole. This 
limitation also begged that I do comparative analysis with international models so as 
to assess their impact on prison gangs. Significantly, many of my interviewees 
refuted much of Steinberg’s propositions as being fictitious.45 This is significant in 
that much of the foundations being observed are premised in a mythology and its 
operations are fiercely safeguarded by its proponents through threat of death, and by 
an intense desire to see this mythology surviving any threats to its existence. This 
leads to researchers alike being nagged by insecurities that their subjects may, in 
some way, be untruthful in their accounts relating to any operations of the South 
African prison Number gangs.  
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The study has adhered to the ethical definitions of academic research. The critical 
issue of reflexivity had to be given careful consideration as my perceptions of 
prisons, prisoners, and deviance alike had been dramatically influenced by my 
research. The fact that my biological father had acted as a go-between was never to 
be an issue that would impinge upon the ethical standard of the research paper, as he 
(my father) had long since been an absent parent, and I believe that he gave as much 
of himself to his role as go-between as possible in the hopes of making amends for 
not being there for me as a parent. Using him as a go-between, however, proved to 
often put my interviewees in an ethical dilemma in that they were torn between their 
gang code (which demanded secrecy) and their blood-brother pact with my go-
between to tell me what I needed to know. 
 
Sling Blade approved of any submission regarding his interviews to be published. 
The one-on-one interviews lasted as long as prison times permitted them to; this 
negotiation was both fragile and dangerous as the Number gangs (in the section 
where I was detained) considered me to be a sterk frans (an influential non-gang 
member). To this end, and according to them, I was considered an asset albeit that in 
the greater prison gang socialization I was afforded no rights – including no rights to 
negotiate interviews, more especially no rights to speak about the Number gangs. A 
literature review of prison gang dynamics proved to be highly debatable as the 
subjects often gave conflicting interpretations of gang mythology. To this end, the 
published works thus far cannot be completely substantiated. What is more, 
information regarding gangs has been found to be lacking in the public domain. Thus 
my interviews were many times unstructured, as my intention was to be exposed to 
the world of the Number gangs given a prisoner’s perspective. The study was 
conducted with a more than cautious approach, not only for my reflexivity, validity 
and authenticity of the thesis, but also for my own personal safety. After all, I was a 
trail awaiting prisoner at the time with no gang affiliation. The qualitative nature of 
the subject matter demanded that I refrain from adopting a close-ended questioning 
approach. Instead, the research suited a flexibility that allowed the interviewees to 
talk freely. In so doing, I found that I could do more comprehensive probing.  
The source would at times want to direct the flow of information, and as the 




elicit more information, but many times I felt compelled to redirect and force the 
interview questionnaire. Access to information, albeit initially agreed upon was 
constantly re-negotiated in an attempt to harness the most factual account of prison 
gang dynamics. This approach was necessary, given that a subject’s account of a life 
premised in a mythology is often difficult to validate and easy to conflate. The other 
contentious aspect of such research is man’s ego and thus a subject’s possible 
inability to give a true account of events, especially in scenarios where the subject is 
shown in a weakened position (e.g. prison rape). In such a situation the subject may 
feel too ashamed to admit that he was raped or participated in acts of sodomy. To this 
end, my interview catalogue proved to be a useful reference; moreover, I was able to 
access my previous subjects that had submitted to interviews outside prison to 
corroborate many participants’ propositions. 
 
Given that I had been given a comprehensive account of the prison gang structure by 
my biological father – who had been a member of the Number gangs - I used this 
insight into the gangs to negotiate more information. This was a proverbial ‘double-
edged sword’ as my method could either have elicited an abundance of research 
value, or the Number gangs could have regarded me as a threat, as I had been given 
insight into their mythical lore and organization. The research context was ever 
threatening my personal safety.  My father had equipped me with the ‘inner circle’ 
mannerisms, including code language (sabela) used by the Number gangs. The 
subjects were surprised at my insight into their world and thus spoke on subjects 
where I showed proficiency. I summoned courage and many times contested for truth 
when I felt that an interviewee was seeking to distort truth and (at least in their 
minds) “protect the Number.” This I can attribute to one of two factors: (1) they were 
misleading me all along, ever suspicious of my knowledge and suspecting me of 
belonging to a vierde kamp(who are often killed as they are regarded as enemies of 
the Number gangs), or (2) they were confused by the exact phenomenon now 
crippling the Number gangs, where incumbents are being exposed and initiated into a 
diluted version of the Number gangs outside of prison, and when they become 




they were ‘born’ outside and to a new, modernized and bastardized version of the 
Number gangs ethos. 46 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The study has found, through analysis of fifty interviews, that South Africa’s 
colonial and apartheid legacy has been pervasive in all attributes of its society and 
that it has had a devastating impact on millions of lives. The very essence of living as 
a member of South African society invokes this legacy that has led to severe 
dislocations within communities and dysfunctions within many government 
institutions including the prison system. Crime and criminality was thus also affected 
and this has implications for all living in South Africa. Being incarcerated 
disenfranchises individuals to such a degree that they lose their sense of self; the 
Number gangs provide a means for prisoners to assert a sense of dignity and identity 
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PRISON GANGS AND THEIR OPERATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Gangs originated from the drive of young men belonging to the poorest tier of Cape 
Town’s society seeking to order themselves into organizations.48 These individuals 
had little or no access to education, formal employment, and were objects of scorn. 
The government, embracing harsh discriminatory legislation, actively disempowered 
and disenfranchised them. The contemporary psychological gauge that measures the 
effects of such disentitlement is called ‘the emasculation of the Black man’.49  
 
(1) Prison gangs 
Coloured and Black inmates mostly populate South African prisons.50 What makes 
South African prison gangs distinctive from prison gangs in other countries are their 
operation, their nation-wide organization, and their historical foundations. These 
gangs have an elaborate structure, disciplinary code and ranking that pre-dates the 
South African Department of Correctional services.51 In effect, there is only one 
genealogy for the principle gangs. Prisons are dominated by the notorious Number 
gangs of which the 28s are the strongest, followed by the 26s, and the once-powerful 
27s gang is now almost defunct. Although other smaller gangs are still prevalent, 
notably the Big 5 and the Airforce gangs, their existence in South African prisons is 
part of an intricate symbiosis carefully dictated by the Number gangs.52 The gangs 
organize themselves in a hierarchically ordered quasi-military structure. They refer to 
themselves as ‘men of the Number’.53  
 
My research argues that the very organization of the prison gangs promotes its 
influence both inside and outside of prison.54 The militaristic programming is 
presumed to give a degree of esprit de corps – a meaningful bonding and support 
structure for people disadvantaged by colonialism and apartheid.55 As the prison 
gangs organized themselves as a means to oppose their ‘unjust custodians’, 
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contemporary outside gangs assimilate similar quasi-militaristic ranking structures so 
as to remain powerfully organized against whomever they deem to be opponents. 
This thesis must thus analyse, at least in abridged form, the organizational structures 
adopted by the prison gangs as its proponents are fiercely honour-bound to it.56 
Membership is in theory (although not in reality) voluntary. Although the gangs 
share a principle genealogy, each gang draws from its own oral tradition and 
champions its own distinctive (albeit mostly imaginary) uniforms, tattoos, flags, 
salutes, and other military characteristics. Prison gangs specify hierarchical duties for 
each rank, and the gangs themselves are primarily distinguished according to specific 
gang objectives: the 28s protect, pamper, and organize sexual partners (wives) or 
‘wyfies’, the 27s kill to protect and enforce the codes of the 26s and 27s, and the 26s 
employ patience and cunning tactics to steal and rob inmates. Smaller gangs like the 
Big Five (who seek to maximize their privileges by informing and collaborating with 
prison authorities) and the Royal Air Force (who organize mass escapes) also have 
set goals and, in theory, each gang ought to respect the work of other the gangs.57 
Not only are the goals of each gang mutually exclusive, but according to tradition 
their hours of operation also differ: the 28s work at night, their symbol is sunset; the 
26s work during the day and they may not kill after sunset except in self-defense – 
their symbol is sunrise. All my interviewees substantiated Lotter’s operational layout 
for prison gangs.58  
The Number gangs’ code also legitimises their tendency to leech off mpatas (non-
gang inmates). This code states that they (the Number gangs) are empowered to 
obtain contraband and other items from mpatas (also called franse) through various 
means including deception, intimidation, or acts of violence.59 The Number gangs 
regard the mpatas as a potential prey and to this end they (mpatas) have no 
entitlements. Beyond economic profiteering, the Number gangs also influence and 
regulate the mental, social, and sexual victimization of the prison population.  
The Number gangs employ labelling techniques that deepens the rifts between the 
already segregated prison populations. Here prisoners (including gangs) are labelled 
as being either skoon (clean) or vuil (dirty). The Big 5 gang, generally viewed as 
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informants, are regarded as being vuil mpatas while the Airforce gang, renowned as 
escapees, are regarded as being skoon mpatas. This labelling technique is a vital 
component of the Number gangs code as any contravention of the prison gang code 
is labelled as being vuil or as being aligned to a vierde kamp (a new and opposing 
gang).60 Vuil mpatas are targeted and acts of violence are generally directed at them. 
The Number gangs are code-bound to respect each other and peacefully co-exist; to 
an extreme end, the code dictates that the respective Number gangs should be willing 
to die for one another.61 This doctrine, in practice, becomes difficult to enforce as 
conflict between the Number gangs is common and relations are tense often 
negotiated. To this end, the gang code entrenches certain foundations that prohibit 
fighting amongst the Number gangs. This thesis finds with Lötter who argues that 
one such institution is a communication restriction between individuals in the 
different number gangs.  Only certain ‘office officials’ are thus permitted to 
communicate or liase with other gang members. It is common to find examples of 
gangs punishing their own members for contravening this communication limitation 
in instances where conflict is to be avoided.  It is of paramount importance that the 
Number gangs maintain respectful and orderly inter-gang relations under the Number 
ethos which dictates that they each have an understanding and commitment to 
‘conduct their own operations without undue interruption’.62  The 26s work with 
money matters which they obtain through deceiving techniques and trickery. The 
27s, an almost extinct gang, are charged with ‘blood’ work, implying that violence 
and assault related operations are their domain.  The 28s work with ‘blood and 
poison’, which refers to their assault and poisoning hit squads; the 28s also renowned 
(albeit greatly contested by many of its members) for the provision and service of 
catamites to the various Number gangs. Whenever a gang (or any of its individual 
members) or prison staff impinges upon the work ethic of another gang, conflict 
results e.g. when the 26s are found to keep wyfies (catamites) they will come into 
conflict with the 28s.63 
Old gang members are retired from active duty according to the Numbers gang ethos, 
and may continue to serve the respective gang in an administrative capacity or as a 
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wise elder. Trial awaiting prisoners are also subjected to the power and influence of 
the Number gangs during a process called stimela. During this process new inmates 
may be stripped of their possessions or fall prey to sexual attacks.64 In these 
scenarios, gang membership becomes an attractive feature as real or perceived 
benefits may include protection, companionship, access to contraband, and status.65 
 
My research finds that street gangs both organize themselves and operate in similar 
ways when compared to prison gangs.66 Although the street gangs’ execution of 
organization is not exact, the mythology of the Number gangs endures through this 
process. Irwin and Cressey, in contrast, argues that the prisoner code was an 
extension of the criminal code that is found outside prison and is brought to prison 
from the streets by newly sentenced criminals.67 This issue is contentious and will be 
explained under the section titled Mythology as the prison gangs themselves have 
different origins, viz the 28s and 27s originated outside prison, whereas the 26s have 
their fount inside prison. It becomes evident that some prison gangs are appendages 
of criminal structures operating outside prison, while others originate in prison. The 
introduction of outside super-gangs that are economically powerful, hardened and 
violent into the prison gang dynamics infuses new prison gang orthodoxy, one that is 
not code bound, however.68 To this end, the age-old traditions and ethos of the 
Number gangs become diluted through it being mutated by the volatile super-gang 
culture that permeates the prison subculture. The Number gangs thus struggle to 
attain solidarity and order, and function in a crippled state, whereas outside prison 
their mutated mythology (in the form of gangs fashioned on the Number gangs) 
engenders a more economically powerful apparatus.69 
 
(2) Number gangs’ origins: Nongoloza  
My research uncovered an astounding paradigm: members of the Number gangs who 
were overwhelmingly brainwashed by Number gangs’ creed and mythology were in 
some way unable to abandon its influence.70 Many such individuals, when released 
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from prison, had problems adapting to everyday life outside the confines of the 
prison fraternity and thus continued their Number gangs practices outside of prison 
(the paper will later address high recidivism rates in South Africa as a function of 
this paradigm).71 Notably, my protagonist participant, Sling Blade, was found wholly 
integrating his prison personality with his civilian being. As a result, Sling Blade was 
found to choose living in an informal settlement with seven young men after being 
released from prison instead of going home to his beautiful wife and children. He left 
prison and sought to live the Number gangs’ mythology in a literal sense. This 
phenomenon further substantiates as an example of prison gang influences as the 
Number gang members that are unable to be rehabilitated by the prison experience, 
continue to foster and promote prison Number gang credo and operation outside of 
prison. What is more, my research found that many ex prison gang members were 
living out the mythology with almost biblical dedication. Thus my research must 
analyse the Number gangs’ mythology in an attempt to understand its potency in its 
delivery as a brainwashing device that facilitates prison gang prevalence and 
dominance.  As many of the interviewees confirmed that Number gang exponents 
continued to live the mythology if they were released from prison, the paper 
undertakes to start the analysis with the forefather of the Number gangs, a man called 
Nongoloza. 
 
My research confirms with both Steinberg and Lewis, and identifies two distinct 
versions of Nongoloza: (1) The actual man, Mzuzephi Mathebula, who adopted the 
name Nongoloza when he started his reign within the criminal underworld, and (2) 
the great-king Nongoloza, whose mythology was invented and continues to be 
transmitted as truth within all South African prisons.72Steinberg posits that the real-
life Nongoloza drifted into mediocrity at the same time that his mythical alter-
identity ascended to become the great-king of South African prisons.73 The real 
Nongoloza was given a pauper’s funeral when he died in 1948. Most of the 
exponents of the Number gangs, however, refute this as Nongoloza is the central 
theme in the prison gang ethos. The Number gangs have their fount in the early 20th 
century bandits called the Ninevites gang which was composed of young black men 
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who had refused employment with the white management in the mining task outside 
of Johannesburg.74 A spirited and determined Zulu migrant, the self-named 
Nongoloza Mathebula molded his group of bandits according to the organizational 
rank and structure found in the Transvaal Republic’s military and the Natal Colony’s 
judiciary. This quasi-military organization of the Ninevites gang came with its own 
imaginary uniforms and other imagined paraphernalia75. Nongoloza decreed a 
Nineveh Law that was a doctrine based upon biblical sanctions.76 Such and many 
other imaginings were embraced by the many thousand of disenfranchised black 
young men, victimized and criminalized by both the colonial legacy and apartheid’s 
discriminatory laws, as they wandered into and out of prisons at the beginning of the 
20th century.  
 
(3)Mythology 
The Brandvlei Report, which details the structures, functions, and modus operandi of 
the Number gangs, was (and still is) influential in exposing much of the prison 
Number gangs’ mythology to outside audiences.77 The report captures the origins of 
Nongoloza, the sacred prison gang language (called sabela) and gives insight into the 
mythological narratives and rites of passage.78 The Brandvlei Report is so insightful, 
that it had many (if not all of my subjects) bemoaning its existence. It is regarded as 
a betrayal to the Number gangs’ ethos since it was elicited from a prison gang 
member in exchange for better living conditions (alleged to be information 
exchanged for Kentucky Fried Chicken rations, according to Sling Blade).79 The 
Number gangs’ mythology is regarded as sacred and a threat to the gangs’ existence 
if non-members were able to readily interpret its foundations.80  
 
My interviews confirm Steinberg’s assertion that various versions of the Ninevites 
gang could be found in all South African prisons by 1930, testaments to the gang’s 
infectious doctrine and the prevailing orthodoxy that compelled young men to join 
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such fraternities. 81 These prison gangs have endured and remained resilient to 
attempts at destroying them, and they remain as pervasive in South African prisons 
today. Nongoloza’s doctrine is still celebrated and embraced (albeit diluted in many 
contemporary settings), along with all the paramilitary mythology, and is transmitted 
along the prisoner generations.82 The Number gangs’ mythology is riddled with both 
contradictions and congruencies, either contingent upon which version of the oral 
history is being examined, viz. that of the 26s, 27s, or the 28s. This paradigm of 
varied retelling is significant of many if not all mythologies. The 26s, 27s, and the 
28s are in disagreement regarding a variety of Nongoloza’s alleged actions, and there 
exists great dissent about the manner in which the Number gangs ought to co-exist 
within the contemporary framework.83 Since the mythology is such a pivotal 
component of the Number gangs’ operations, this study thus explores the abridged 
narrative and gives an account of how my interviewees interpreted the mythology in 
contemporary settings: 
 
The arcane tale starts in a remote village somewhere in South Africa at the time of 
industrialization. The 28s argue that the village is a Zulu one but the 27s contest this 
demographic. An elderly soothsayer (the 27s call him Paul Mobasa or Po, while the 
28s call him Nkulukut) is a protagonist within the village. The village’s young men 
leave for the gold mines to seek their fortunes and never return from their journey. 
The old seer treks to the mines himself to find out what has happened to the village’s 
progeny. While living at the all-men mining compounds Nkulukut discovers that the 
young men are being worked like slaves and die in the process of mining the white 
man’s gold. Nkulukut thus leaves the mining compounds and retires to a cave on the 
outskirts of the Pietermaritzburg, which serves as his lair. His cave is a place of 
meditation and is regarded as being agter die berge (behind the mountains). 
Nkulukut devises a secretive language with which to address the young men whom he 
intends to save from the death awaiting them at the white man’s mines – the white 
man must not know what is being discussed when he addresses his soon-to-be- 
followers. From the vantage point of his lair, Nkulukut observes a dust-cloud moving 
on the road from Zululand toward the mines. Nkulukut leaves his cave to meet the 
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cloud and find a young man named Nongoloza inside. After warning Nongoloza of 
the dangers of the mines, Nkulukut convinces him to steal the gold from the white 
man instead and entices him to his (Nkulukut’s) den84. The following day, Nkulukut 
witnesses the same dust-cloud, albeit this time coming from Pondoland. He 
intercepts the cloud to find a young Pondo man, Nkilikijan, and does the same 
enticing ritual as before. This procedure continues until Nkulukut has 15 disciples in 
his cave. He grooms them in his secret language and the skill of banditry.85  
 
 This aspect of the mythology is significant Sling Blade in the same way recruited 
minions into his 28s gang after he was released from prison. Many of my other 
subjects also attest to similar accounts. Part of Sling Blade’s indoctrination policy 
was that it was healthier to steal as a means to make a living than scavenge in the 
‘white man’s world’.86 Furthermore, it is found that Sling Blade initiated his recruits 
by teaching them to sabela as a means of communication. Such practice is consistent 
with other subjects that I had interviewed.  
The mythology continues: The young thieves become skilled bandits and soon their 
booty includes army surplus in the form of munitions and uniforms. The law now 
hunted Nkulukut’s bandits. They hid in the caves outside the mining towns and 
subdivided into two parties, notably Nkilikijan took seven bandits and operated 
during the day whilst Nongoloza took six bandits and plunders at nighttime.87At some 
point hereafter, the two groups of bandits went plundering together, which was 
unusual as it was tradition that Nongoloza would work at night whilst Nkilikijan 
toiled during the day. On this particular occasion, however, Nongoloza claimed that 
he felt ill and he requested that one of Nkilikijan’s minions, a young man called 
Magubane, stay behind with him and nurse him. To this end, thirteen left the cave to 
plunder, while Nongoloza and Magubane stayed behind. Nkilikijan allegedly returns 
to the cave earlier than expected and finds Nongoloza and Magubane engaged in 
sexual congress under a cowhide. Nkilikijan is repulsed by this and challenges 
Nongoloza to fight. Nongoloza defends that he and Magubane are entitled to have 
sex as it is decreed that women are poisonous transmitters of disease and that 
soldiers are instead allowed to select wives from the younger recruits within their 
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respective divisions. Nkilikijan apparently then attacks Nongoloza with his saber and 
the two engage in battle until Nongoloza stands ankle-deep and Nkilikijan knee-deep 
in blood. The wise Nkulukut demands that the two bandits stop fighting and instructs 
Nkilikijan to investigate if homosexual practices are practiced at the mining 
compounds of Delagoa Bay.88Taking heed of Nkulukut’s orders, Nkilikijan heads for 
Delagoa Bay with only seven followers, leaving Magubane with Nongoloza, who in 
turn, heads for Germiston on the Moliva River with eight men in his arsenal. This is 
one version of the origins of the 27s and the 28s where the ‘2’ becomes symbolic of 
the originators, namely Nongoloza and Nkilikijan.89 The two agree to go their 
separate ways and agree to follow the old tradition of toiling at different times, the 
27s during the day and the28s at night. Both will later agree that Nkilikijan did find 
homosexual practices at the compounds, but the gangs disagree about its 
implications: the 28s argue that this validates Nongoloza’s claim that homosexuality 
is legitimate, while the 27s assert that homosexuality is symptomatic of the unnatural 
practices that whites expose blacks to.90  
 
This part of the mythology is further corroborated by all my interviewees and is part 
of the foundations that Sling Blade used to initiate his minions outside of prison. 
According to Sling Blade, it is imperative to continue the traditions without distorting 
them so as to further the ideals of giving the Number gangs a sense of continuance 
and heritage. It is confirmed that the 28s will do execute what they consider to be 
their work (thievery etc) at night whilst the 27s do their ‘work’ during the day. 91 To 
this end, I found that Sling Blade and his bandits were robbing people and plundering 
houses at night in various areas across the Western Cape. My subjects all confirmed 
that the traditions are still adhered to today and that it is a grave offense for a 
particular gang to be found executing its activities at the wrong time of day. The 
punishments for such transgressions are harsh, and could even lead to assassinations. 
These aspects of the mythology serve to further influence Number gangs 
‘dominance. 
This abridged version of the Number gangs’ origins also exposes highly contested 
recruitment protocols that besiege purists within the Number gangs’ parliaments. The 
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paper will further explore this issue under the section named Recruitment as it is 
found to influence prison gang dominance when regulation rites regarding Number 
gang member recruitment is done contrary to the prescribed mythology. Moreover, it 
is found that 26s are recruiting outside of prison, where the mythology forbids such 
practice as only the 28s and 27s are permitted to recruit outside of prison as they (28s 
and 27s) originated outside of prison. According to the mythology the 26s were 
‘born’ in prison, thus they are only permitted to recruit inside prison – outside of 
prison recruitment is the sole mandate of 28s and 27s.92 
 
The mythology continues where both the bandits Nongoloza and Nkilikijan found 
themselves imprisoned together at Point Prison in Durban.93 The 27s and the 28s 
agreed that their prison influence would extend to the practice of confiscating the 
possessions of franse (non-gang affiliated inmates). The mythology contends that 
Nongoloza and Nkilikijan found six franse sitting in a corner flipping a silver coin. 
When Nongoloza demanded that their leader, Grey, hand over their possessions, he 
refused. Nongoloza then fought with Nkilikijan regarding the rights of the six franse 
to kringsit (congregate). Albeit that there exists different versions of the agreement 
that finally allows Grey’s and his followers to become a gang inside prison (26s), 
this version is most salient: Upon his arrival at Point Prison, Nongoloza stabbed a 
warder and was put in solitary confinement as a result; his food was rationed and 
salt less and Nkilikijan smuggled nourishing foodstuffs and salt to him in concern; 
when Nongoloza is taken out of solitary confinement, Nkilikijan informs him that 
Grey and his followers had secured the nourishments through their cunning and 
trickery and that they (Grey’s men) could, in turn, serve the 27s and the 28s. 
Nongoloza finally accepts Nkilikijan’s advice and they concede that Grey and his 
followers may constitute into the third and final bandit gang, called the 26s. They 
decree that any other gang (fourth camp) will be destroyed and that all other inmates 
will be regarded as being franse. Nongoloza and Nkilikijan also agree that the 27s 
will take responsibility for the 26s’ transgressions and that the 28s will come into 
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conflict with the 27s if they wrong the 26s. They agree that the three gangs would 
regard each other like brothers and that they are avowed to die for each other.94  
 
It is apparent that the gangs originated outside of prison. The prison gang, however, 
is a prison-based phenomenon and history reveals how even the genesis of the gang 
was determined by, and crystallized out of the all-male institutions of compounds 
and prisons. Gangs are also born out of prison culture as a means of coping with the 
hardships of prison life. Prison gangs influence both the formal and informal social 
organization of prison life. It is found that prison gangs, through enforcing both gang 
codes and “the more generic inmate code”, controls the interface between both 
prisoners and prison staff and largely contribute to continued negative sentiment and 
opposition to the prison administration and its employees. Prison gangs rule through 
fear and intimidation and will not hesitate to enforce violence to secure their power 
status within the prison hierarchy. Furthermore, the Number gangs operate according 
to their creed and mythology, which demands that they and only they are the 
legitimate authority in prison. To this end, they are intolerant of any other gangs 
being formed in prison, even to the extent of physically eliminating them.95This 
makes them a dominant feature in prison landscape, often (where necessary) rivalling 
management and thus it contributes to the Number gangs maintaining an overall 
influential status.96 
 
(4)The homosexual Nongoloza 
Van Onselen asserts that the practice of homosexual activities amongst the bandits 
may have their roots in the fact that early 20th century Johannesburg saw an increase 
in sexually transmitted diseases, especially amongst the mining communities where 
miners often subscribed to prostitution services.97 In response, Nongoloza prohibited 
his gang of Ninevites to engage in sexual congress with the source of this “poison” 
(venereal disease) – women/prostitutes. Instead, the Ninevites were permitted to pair 
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with younger male recruits and keep them as ‘boy-wives’.98 As a result, prisons and 
mining compounds showed an increased acceptance of homosexual behavior. 
Steinberg argues that much of the prison conflict has its fount in the dynamics of 
sexual relationships inside prisons as seen in the 1977 example where an inmate 
implicated his catamite in the hope that he could have “her” on death row with him.99 
The explanation given was that in all relationships, we move with our partners – they 
do not stay behind but face adversity with us. This mentality speaks of an inculcated 
prison pathology that shows the potency of the male-male bonding experience within 
the prison confines, as well as the intensity of prison relationships, amongst other 
things. 
 
All 28s interviewed vehemently deny homosexual practices within their rank and 
file. Instead, they argue that the sex between men is face-to-face, implying that there 
is no anal penetration during such acts. As it is a stereotype propagated by the 26s 
and 27s, the (28s) assert in retaliation that the 27s and 26s are the culprits that have 
penetrative sex.100 Steinberg argues that this practice is stolen from the Zulu tradition 
that permits unmarried couples to have sex before they marry on the condition that 
there is no penetration, that is, that it happens ‘deur die boude’ (between the thighs). 
101 Many of my subjects argued that Nongoloza never had penetrative sex with 
Magubane, as it was always ‘deur die boude’. To this end, Sling Blade asserts that 
whenever 28s have sexual congress, that there should be no penetration, as in 
accordance with the law of Nongolza. If penetrative sex is discovered between men 
of the 28s, a death sentence may be passed in retaliation to this transgression. Sling 
Blade contends that Nongoloza condemned one of his own (a man named Mtjutjies) 
to death when he found the disciple to have anal intercourse with another. In order to 
remind all 28s of this event, an office still exists within the gangs’ parliament in the 
name of Mtjutjies, but that the office is empty, since Mtjutjies was killed for his 
transgression. Sling Blade argues that all 28s are aware of this sanction and that they 
are code-bound to honour it.102 
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So why would the sexual activities of the Number gangs constitute as being 
influential in the pervasive nature of the gangs themselves? Gear and Ngubeni’s 
study on sexual violence in South African prisons is insightful as it explores the 
social circumstances that engenders such behaviour. The study asserts that both sex 
and violence have a common denominator in instances where sex is coercive/non-
coercive or pursued in the form of violence.103 When men are incarcerated, their 
contexts become life-changing in that the lack of rehabilitation often alters their 
perception of society and leaves them unable to easily adapt or adjust to 
contemporary social settings.104 Thus society of treats them like pariahs or they 
themselves [released prisoners] perceive rejection from society. This may in turn, 
impact upon recidivism rates as it speaks to those individuals’ capacity (or 
incapacity) to adapt and realign with society after they have been released.  
 
Many of my subjects claimed that sexual violence was part and parcel of prison life 
in that many prison gangs initiate members by sexual violating them. The argument 
is thus that prison gangs purposively legitimate sexual violence as part of its 
operational activities.105 This paper later addresses the impact of such practice on 
both the victims and the prison institute as a whole in a section titled ‘Stunted 
transformation and the endorsement of violence’. My research concludes that similar 
practices occur outside prison when the Number gangs’ mythology is enforced 
outside the confines of the prison establishment. As previously mentioned, my 
research found that Sling Blade had elected to live with seven young men in an 
informal settlement instead of going home to his wife and children after he had been 
released. I found that he was earnestly attempting to mirror Nongoloza’s life by 
living with the young men in a cave like environment. As they were all men living 
together, I (cautiously) enquired as to whether any sexual congress prevailed 
amongst the men. Although the men responded that there was no such physical 
intimacy, I could assess that some of the younger men were contracted to doing what 
the Number gangs consider to be ‘wyfie werk’ (female work), namely cleaning duties 
and other household chores. The collective all asserted that they ‘bandiet’ (rob and 
plunder) at night. Since this sexual practice is an integral part of both the Number 
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gangs’ mythology and operations, it serves as an undeniable influence in their (the 
Number gangs’) continued dominance.   
 
(5) Number Gangs’ Recruitment 
The recruitment technique and procedure, also heavily immersed in mythology, 
varies amongst the Number gangs and is found to be contingent upon the respective 
gangs’ function within prison.106 This process is a detailed one and is a substantial 
contributor to the influence that the Number gangs have within South African 
society. My research finds that there are three distinct recruitment paradigms at play: 
the first method is the purist’s version where candidate recruits are initiated using the 
traditional method, that is, where the full mythology is imparted; the second method 
is when candidate gang members are initiated (outside of prison) with only an 
abridged version of the mythology, a ‘mutated’ version of the ‘Number’ according to 
purist; the third method is a product of the first two methods, where recruits are 
initiated whilst waiting to be sentenced, that is, trial-awaiting prisoners are given 
initiation into the Number gangs even before they  (alternately if they ever do) get 
sentenced to be imprisoned. Notably the third version of recruitment is also employs 
only a diluted version of the Number gangs’ mythology. 
 
My research concludes that 28s and 26s are mostly involved with the recruitment 
process, where for example, an incumbent of the 26s will be brought to the kamp 
(gang territory) by the gang inspector. The prison recruitment process is intimately 
linked to prison gang genealogy. As mentioned, the recruitment of new gang 
members is in accordance with the Number gangs’ mythology that enslaves its 
membership to its doctrine. An abridged version of the (26s) recruitment process 
follows: 
The incumbent recruit is given to the care of a gatekeeper and is forbidden for six 
days to enter the hekke (imaginary gates) that give him access to the gang. During 
this period he is examined and a possible spy or as one with spots (dirty marks which 
alludes to the incumbent’s character). It is the inspector’s (gang investigator) 
responsibility to investigate the recruit’s background and validate his character.  
When the hekke (gates) are opened to the recruit he is admitted. Training begins 
                                                




through instruction regarding inter alia: the gang code, his duties, details regarding 
the ranks and structure, and a description of his uniform and equipment (both 
imaginary) that are issued unto him.107 My research agrees with Steinberg’s thesis 
that a prisoner’s ability to assimilate and recall the gang creed is his most powerful 
survival tool. 108 The recruit is officially inducted in a special gathering of officers.  
At this stage the inspector will again search the recruit for markings from other 
gangs.  The Nyangi (doctor) will examine the recruit to assess his status as a healthy, 
prepared new member.  A foot stamping tribute called one-time shotgun and two-
time shotgun is enacted and the Mabalang (clerk) records the recruit’s name into the 
book (imaginary) of the 26s.  
My subjects all confirm this practice, but argue that the shotgun salute is done during 
the ‘taking off stimela’ period. The incumbent has now graduated and becomes a 
‘Ndota’ (brother). His journey through the ranks of the gang will give him more 
access to die boek (imaginary book containing the 26s ethos).  
The gang creed thus also legitimizes an active recruitment program that includes 
assimilating gang members that have been transferred from other prison facilities, so 
as to strengthen the Number gangs. This process increases the population numbers of 
the respective Number gangs and is thus an influential factor. The gangs are found to 
perform specific functions within the unitary Numbers gang foundation: the 28s 
work with blood and poison and are in the business of wyfies (catamites), while at the 
same time being generally in charge of maintaining adequate prison conditions.109 
Thus the recruitment process is an integral part in what plays out to be a proverbial 
‘human resources’ function as it offers a means for new members to be assimilated 
into specific roles within the respective gangs. The Number gangs’ code enforces 
organizational aims, which dictate that all members – if need be – will wetslaan 
(oppose authorities) and compel better living conditions for all prisoners. The 28s are 
therefore expected to correct conditions that are perceived to be unsatisfactory, for 
example, if there are bed lice or the food is rationed, the 28s will stab either prison 
wardens or vuil mpatas. This process itself contributes toward the continued 
dominance of the Number gangs within the South African prisons landscape as their 
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(the Number gangs’) opposition to (and sometimes attacks on) prison administration 
affords them a certain status which argues that the Number gangs are a substantial 
authority in their own right. The gangs are code-bound to engage in acts of violence 
targeting either authorities or vuil mpatas to attain better living conditions. All my 
subjects confirmed that either authorities or vuil mpatas can be targeted for physical 
assaults if the Number gangs’ pleas for better conditions are not met.  
As mentioned, the Numbers gang all share a pseudo-military organisation with either 
civil or military rank and file. These include detailed paraphernalia such as flags and 
equipment that are all imaginary. The imaginary uniforms imitated from the early 
Boer Republic, including .303 bayonet rifles, are still an integral part of the Number 
gangs’ doctrine; the paramilitary hierarchy - devised by Nongoloza - which divided 
exponents into judicial officers and soldiers (where the former are further sub-
divided into upper and lower divisions) is still operational.110 The recruitment 
process decides upon the relevant ranking of the new recruits. Promotion and ranking 
are assessed according to competence and knowledge of the gang but also through 
acts of violence in the fighting line. Each rank is a symbolic replica of position in the 
‘white’ military, police or justice administration with its own associated imaginary 
and real duties.111 Nongoloza and his successors’ choice of symbols used by the 
gangs give insight into the motives and value systems of the ‘Number.’112  
 
The gangs have, in effect, created elaborate alternate societies and borrowed the 
terminology and symbols of the powerful agents of the colonial administration, the 
army, the police, and the courts. The choice of symbol is not surprising given that 
these agents all represented power as they delivered fierce discriminatory blows to 
all that failed to fit in colonial and ultimately apartheid based designs.113 The 26s are 
comprised of two sections, namely the junior section composed of inter alia soldiers 
and sergeants whilst the captain and judge ranks can be found in the senior section.114 
The 28s on the other hand, have two lines: the blood line, composed of a junior and 
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senior section, which define the soldiers or fighting line; and the private line, also 
composed of junior and senior sections but this time denoting wyfies and those higher 
ranked who have ascended through the wyfie rank.115 Notably, the Number gangs’ 
recruitment policies enable its tendency to legitimise sexual violence (and violence in 
its own right) by subjugating certain members into distinct feminine roles.116  
As mentioned, the recruitment process itself, nowadays, is fraught with contestation 
as it is done in pure and mutated ways. According to my sources, the process of 
initiating members outside of prison, often using only a diluted mythology, has lead 
to conflict within the Number gangs as its prison members view recruits that were 
not initiated using the traditional and complete mythology with suspicion. As the 
diluted mythology does not provide the full tradition, prison ndotas often treat the 
‘half-initiated’ recruits with contempt and often treat them like vuil mpatas who were 
sent by the authorities to infiltrate the Number gangs so as to dissolve their (the 
Number gangs’) power. Furthermore, the newly observed trend to initiate and recruit 
trial-awaiting prisoners adds to this distortion of the Number gangs’ mythology. It is 
found that the Number gangs tend to recruit in trial-awaiting prison sections when 
their influence is threatened; they thus initiate and recruit trial-awaiting prisoners 
through intimidation or force so as to consolidate numbers against whomever the 
opposing force would be (viz a rival gang or prison administration).  
 
The problem, according to stalwarts and purists alike, is that the mythology is 
distorted due to either time constraints or due to the incumbent recruit being released 
from prison (as he was trial-awaiting and not guaranteed a prison stay). Thus the 
newly-initiated trial-awaiting member that gets freed from the trial awaiting prison 
could easily join a gang outside of prison and convey the diluted mythology. And 
thus the cycle of contestation regarding Number gang members who were recruited 
incorrectly continues whenever any gang members outside of prison, recruited using 
this ‘bastardized’ version of nongoloza’s mythology, enters prison claiming to be a 
‘son of Nongoloza’.117  The principle of initiating and recruiting members into the 
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Number gangs using a diluted mythology is called ‘panthle nombers’ and is 
discussed later in the section titled Diluted Numbers.118 This paradoxically 
dysfunctional (albeit effective) recruitment trend functions to amplify the powerbase 
yielded by the Number gangs as it remains a highly populated, organised and 
operational thorn at the side of South African prison administration.  
 
(6) Number Gangs’ Communication 
As each gang has developed its own mythical uniforms, so too have they developed 
their own languages, which are variants of the prison slang (sabela) and constituted 
of an Afrikaans-African language hybrid. The distinction between gang and non-
gang members is exemplified by the use of this detailed slang. The gangs have 
further mutated their prison slang into a variant called ‘stellenbom’ in an attempt to 
protect their gang activity.119 Few outside gang culture understand it. A police expert 
explained how someone could be ‘sitting in a room with them and they would talk 
about how they were going to kill you and you wouldn’t know what was going 
on’.120 Communication plays an integral part of the day-to-day activities of the 
Number gangs. To aid the exchange of communication, various principles and 
contexts have to be put into place so as to facilitate a less tense or volatile prison 
environment. Prison gangs require an ability to communicate and exchange 
information; if communication is stifled a real threat of violence confronts either 
prisoners or prison staff or both.  
 
My research reveals a scenario where the 28s in Pollsmore Prison are found 
disciplining one of their own members for transgressing a prison code. In this 
example, a detailed communication relay follows from one section of the prison to 
another section so as to attain an internal judgment on the matter from the 28s senior 
parliament. If the principle members were not consulted regarding the relevant 
disciplinary procedure to be followed, a judgment could be passed regarding the 
matter. This would therefore imply that the Number gangs have a host of possible 
reasons to stage a violent uprising, inter alia an unannounced coup or an unsolicited 
theft from one of the gangs’ moneymaking enterprises (eg drug smuggling). If the 
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glas (information officer/investigator) is not permitted access to certain primary 
places that elicit communication within prisons, for example the kitchen, then the 
gangs will revolt. The glas is an official within all the Number gangs and has an 
imaginary pair of binoculars and keys hanging around his neck - symbolic of his 
capacity to see everything and go anywhere in prison. The work of the glas is 
contingent upon a prison that permits a degree of communication within the prison 
fraternity.121  The prison authorities are thus tasked with this very difficult task of 
restricting prisoner communication so as to limit contraband traffic, whilst at the 
same time keeping it “open” enough to permit a degree of communication between 
the prisoner population so as not to get the gangs to revolt due to the prison 
environment being stifled or too restricted. Thus prisoner communication channels 
are an important feature of Number gangs’ dominance in that it facilitates the 
execution of its various operations. 
 
(7)Number Gangs’ Parliamentary Influence:     
As prison authorities are ever vigilant of gang activity and are keen (at least they 
appear keen) to eradicate the gang culture, the Number gangs have shown resilience 
by evolving their decision-making and management structures. Among other things, 
the Number gangs have evolved their security features, negotiation criteria, war 
agenda, covert activity, securing goods and contraband profiteering rackets, sexual 
activity regulation, member infirmary, elder retirement, general discipline and code 
enforcement.122  
 
Steinberg’s recollection of The State v Pietersen and two others is a crucial example 
of both power and authority-in-execution that the Number gangs have at their 
disposal.123 It also distinguishes the magnitude of the evolution that these processes 
have undergone. The case tells of how an inmate, Marthinus Hollander, a suspected 
member of the informant gang, The Big 5, was ruthlessly murdered by assassins who 
assigned to execute the informant. The execution came in response to perceived in 
deplorable prison conditions and a combined counsel of the 26s, 27s, and 28s 
decided to kill an informant as a symbol of the Number gangs’ disapproval of 
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existing prison conditions. Steinberg alleges that the Number gangs’ parliaments 
meticulously planned and orchestrated the murder, the subsequent investigation, the 
trial, and the cover-up.124 This proposition alludes to the Number gangs having 
influential appendages extending far beyond the realms of prison confines. This 
argument is not unlike examples argued by this paper’s interviewees, who all attest 
to the Number gangs’s ability to swing court outcomes and show the extent of the 
Number gangs’s influence outside the confines of the South African prison 
services.125 The murder was a symbolic cleansing ritual enacted in an attempt to stem 
the violent conflict that happened between the 26s and 28s in Western Cape prisons 
from 1974 to 1978. Whether or not Marthinus Hollander was a vuil mpata (a fifth 
columnist or collaborator with the authorities) is of no consequence; he was the 
scapegoat used to regulate and consolidate the Number gangs’ authority within the 
prison subcultures.  
 
The very proposition of the Number gangs having such powerful influence is 
testament to their pervasive nature – the study suggests that the Number gangs have 
parliamentary influence that extends even into the sacred chambers of South Africa’s 
court rooms. Further testament to the Number gangs’ cohesiveness and esprit de 
corps is Steinberg’s assertion that the men accused of the execution were carefully 
selected by the joint parliament of the 26s, 27s, and 28s – the joint councils had 
decreed that two 27s would be the fall guys for the cleansing ritual.126 The 27s, 
according to the Number gangs’ creed, are charged with the task of maintaining 
peace between the 26s and 28s. Since the war in the late 1970’s lasted for four years, 
the joint parliaments ruled that the 27s had reneged on their commitment to maintain 
peace and two of their (27s) principal members would be sacrificed to correct this 
wrong.  The allegation is thus that the two inmates sentenced to death for Hollander’s 
murder were these exact sacrificial lambs. To this end, the sophistication of the 
mythology that binds these gangs becomes apparent.  
 
The Number gangs’ alleged ability to strategise and implement such intricate 
operations, which appear to have influence outside of the prison institute itself, have 
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a resultant knee-jerk response from the respective prison administration. My research 
argues that in many instances, where it can be seen that the Number gangs both yield 
and execute far-reaching power that influences even courtroom outcomes, the prison 
management has taken drastic retaliatory and punitive sanction in response. An 
example lies within The Barberton Maximum Security Report127 which cites 
administrative malpractice regarding physical abuse toward prisoners who were 
allegedly stripped naked and paraded whilst being flogged with pipes and clubs. The 
report also alludes to a protracted assassination of more than one prisoner in 
instances where warders armed certain prisoners and put them in a tight corner 
scenario where a particular gang by far outnumbers the other – the context is 
enforced to elicit an outcome where the decimation of the smaller gang prevails.128 
My subjects all cite similar cases that suggest instances of apparent malpractice and 
abuse within the Prison Services administration in retaliation to powerful executive 
stances taken by the Number gangs’ parliaments. It is argued that prison 
management, in such instances, are guilty of human rights violations. Undeniably, 
the Number gangs’ parliamentary function outside the confines of the South African 
prisons is a testament to its intensity and powerful influence.  
 
(8) International Numbers 
A remarkable account of the Number gangs’ extent of geographical influence can be 
observed where it is found to operate outside South African borders. My research has 
yielded many subjects to substantiate this claim, most notably a Zimbabwean 
national Marcus Ndlovungu (30 years old) who claims that he served time at Khami 
Medium Prison (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe) between 2004 and 2005.129 Whilst serving 
18 months of a 30 month sentence for stealing a cell phone, Ndlovungu asserts that 
he met a substantial representation of the 28s Number gangs (thus far only prevalent 
in South African prisons) in the Zimbabwean jail. He argues that the 28s were 
militaristically organized and spoke a combination of Ndabele, Zulu, and Afrikaans. 
Khami Medium Prison is renowned for its “Starforce” dominated prison gang, and a 
rival “Inkhatha” prison gang. It thus presents itself as a testament to the phenomenal 
pervasive capability that the South African Number gangs exude in its ability to 
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penetrate international boundaries and take root outside South African borders. 
Another Zimbabwean, Silas Tsvangeri (24 years old) claims to have encountered 
Nongoloza’s 28s at Chikuriubi Prison (Manika Province, Masvingo City Zimbabwe) 
in 2002.130 He claims that they had a substantial following and were highly 
organized. I have since conducted many more interviews with foreigners whose 
motherland are neighbouring African states and they all posit that the Number gangs 
are prevalent in their prisons too. All these subjects argue that the Number gangs’ 
credibility and power stems from their almost (if not) fanatical adherence to the 
Nongolza mythology. This attributes to the considerable influence that the Number 
gangs have in their ability to transcend even international borders.   
 
(9) Diluted Numbers: 
As earlier mentioned, it is argued that Western Cape street gangs have evolved 
themselves into sophisticated criminal empires, using its knowledge of the Number 
gangs’ lore to manufacture a diluted version of Nongoloza’s ideology131. This 
bastardized interpretation of the Number gangs’ creed is being absorbed into most 
street gangs, giving the gangs a sophisticated ideology to adhere to that was 
previously absent. This newfound ideology, being infused into ghetto life, was an 
important factor in the creation of these new and powerful super-gangs as it anoints 
its members with a history and philosophy that sets them above their previous 
identity status – that of street thugs having no honor or code.132 My research finds 
congruence with Pinnock’s proposition that, although it is forbidden within the 
Numbers gang creed for its exponents to recruit outside the confines of prison walls, 
this practice actually occurs and is gaining momentum.133 That is, some components 
of the prison gangs are adapting and enhancing its dominance by challenging its own 
mythology in order to safeguard their survival. The correlation between prison gangs 
and gangs outside becomes stronger as more outside gangs adopt prison gang 
practices and embraces its mythology, albeit most times in a diluted form. 
Irrespective of its potency, this phenomenon bears testament to the pervasive nature 
of Nongoloza’s doctrine and is thus a vivid representation of the far reaching 
influence of the South African prison Number gangs.   
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Pinnock argues that the relative lack of conscious ‘ideology’ compelled the then 
gangs into a stagnant mess that forced them to be thugs utilizing physical force to 
attain deviant ends.134 In the late 1980s one of the Cape’s biggest and most 
influential criminal syndicates, The Firm, began adopting the 28s doctrine by 
recruiting and initiating new gang members inline with Nongoloza’s rituals. The 
Firm thus operates like and calls itself 28s and has even adopted a diluted version of 
the 28s military-styled organization and code. Another Western Cape based super-
gang (often rivaling The Firm), The Americans, adopted a similar adapted version of 
the 26s doctrine, and negotiates its policies in accordance.  
 
Steinberg asserts that this very paradigm that shows outside super-gangs adopting 
Nongoloza’s ideology creates an unprecedented distortion within the prison Number 
gangs code: within the confines of Pollsmore prison, the gang dynamic is influenced 
by an increasingly antagonistic relationship between the 28s and the 26s that is 
similar to and rooted in the rivalry between The Firm and The Americans.135How 
does this come to be? Western Cape street gangs are involved in criminal activity 
and ultimately when exponents of either of these super-gangs (with their bastardized 
account of the Number gangs’ doctrine) are arrested they end up in prison and seek 
refuge within the undiluted doctrine of the Number gangs. Stalwarts (those who did 
time in prison as members of prison gangs in the 1970s and 1980s) within the 
Number gangs frowned upon these outside gangs tampering with the sacred 
traditions of Nongoloza’s mythology.136 They considered the Number gangs to 
operate like brothers that all embrace an anti-colonial heritage, and were repulsed at 
the threat of war between the 26s and 28s due to street gang influence. Moreover, 
where the then white government failed to distort the authority of the Number gangs, 
a simple combination of the fledgling democracy’s transition, drug capitalism, police 
corruption and inefficiency easily diluted the arcane traditions of the Number 
gangs.137 Thus, indirectly, a concert of socio-economic and political factors created 
and continues to germinate new and more influential versions of Nongoloza’s ethos, 
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each inadvertently generating a stronger platform for the Number gangs to command 
power from. 
Steinberg further shows an account of a powerful drug lord named Rashid who was 
sent to Pollsmore Prison and brought with him the access to drugs that could easily 
be smuggled in via prisoners acting as drug mules, or warders that could be bribed to 
smuggle the drugs into prison.138 Rashid’s story is an important piece of the tapestry 
of a changing prison system as it gives insight into how the Number gangs adapt in 
tune with the changing world. Rashid was initiated into the 26s by foregoing any of 
the compulsory traditions and rites of passage required by creed of the 26s. The 
decision to let Rashid bypass the mores of initiation led to the threat of war within 
the ranks of the 26s. Initiates are traditionally compelled to commit a violent act, 
then they have to be brutalized by the prison authorities in response to the deed and 
then they have to show the discipline of enduring the punishment without crying. 
When they (the incumbent initiates) return from solitary confinement, they are 
initiated into the gang by being shown the traditions and customs by its core 
members.139  
 
Traditionally, recruitment is also only the domain of the already sentenced sections 
of prison, as it was regarded too much of a risk to recruit trial-awaiting prisoners. 
The risk lies in the possibility that the incumbent could be acquitted inside his 
training period, which implies that the said candidate intern would be released from 
prison ‘half-caste’.140 In this half-internalised state, the incumbent is regarded a 
threat to the Number gangs alike. Rashid’s case thus presented both the 26s 
parliament and ultimately the Number gangs as a whole with a dilemma: the Number 
gangs’ sacred code had been transgressed in that Rashid had been granted instant 
membership into the 26s without having experienced the traditions of violence and 
learning, and he had made his ascent whilst awaiting trial. In response, according to 
Steinberg, the Number gangs decreed that Rashid must stab either a warder or an 
mpata.141 The individuals responsible for Rashid’s premature initiation would also be 
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face disciplinary measures meted out by the Number gangs’ parliaments.142 
Punishment is harsh and a death instruction is not outside of such sanction if 
conditions ask for it. Within each gang, decisions are made in accordance with the 
prescribed code – gang members submit to gang punishment ranging from ‘klappe’, 
to the ‘beker’.143 A death sentence is also subscribed to as a punitive measure. The 
litany, which accompanies the initiation of a 26s gang member succinctly, illustrates 
this gang doctrine in this example:  
The Nyanghi (doctor)144 takes the initiate’s arm and says, “I bend your arm and break your power and 
share it with all the members of the 26. We are equally strong. If you do wrong, you must take your 
punishment. If you refuse, then you will still have your own strength but then your brothers will kill 
you because we have on 26 thoughts and we share our power equally.145 
 
Another telling account of the pervasive nature of this ‘corruption’ of Nongoloza’s 
creed (this is ambiguous as it can also be regarded as an example of the sporadically 
explosive nature of the Numbers gangs) became apparent when I experienced a 
socialization of its sabela vernacular within the communities that I conducted my 
interviews. Since all my interviews (excluding the prison interviews) were conducted 
in impoverished coloured communities, the gang culture within those communities 
had become so overpoweringly salient that non-gang members within these 
communities were found to be incorporating its linguistic patterns into their 
respective vernaculars. Number gangs slogans such as minute (denoting a temporary 
position) and kroon (money) are only two examples of already incorporated and 
socialized prison gang influences on contemporary society.  
 
My research suggests that, at least informally, there is a strong relationship between 
gangs outside and inside prison – prison gang members who are also members of an 
outside gang will persuade old colleagues to join his gang and vice versa. This 
dynamic becomes complex when, for example, an ex-26s (now in a street gang) 
hypothetically injured another 26 in a rival gang. He would, upon returning to prison, 
have to appear before the ‘Twelve Points’ and risk severe punishment (even 
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death).146 The prison gangs do not tolerate external loyalties. Moreover, the high 
crime rate, coupled with the rate of recidivism in South Africa, leads many prisoners 
to feel that there is a great possibility that they will return to prison and thus they will 
again be able to assume their rank within ‘the Number’.147 New inmates with existing 
associations with outside gangs are almost singularly predisposed to align with 
prison gangs.  Albeit that these outside gangs have no formal relationship with the 
Number gangs, contemporary socio-cultural dynamics within the criminal 
underworld have led to a dedicated correlation between gangs inside and outside 
prison. Lötter asserts that this paradigm became prevalent when most of the Cape 
Town Scorpions and Mafias joined the ranks of the 28s while the Born Free Kids and 
the Mongrels aligned with the 26s.148 This recruitment trend brought about 
congruency between prison gang stratification and street gang rivalry. This, in turn, 
encouraged contemporary segregation within the Numbers gangs. Incumbent 
members are indoctrinated to believe that they join the Number gangs at their 
discretion but this policy is not however strictly adhered to as new inmates are often 
actively recruited through various forms of cohesion, intimidation and 
entrapment.149Although this ‘diluted’ initiation trend remains ever relevant and 
contentious amongst the prison Number gangs’ parliaments, if analysed from the 
perspective of population growth influences, it definitely ranks as a substantial 
contributor. 
 
(10) The South African Liberation’s Lost Sons 
With the advent of democracy in 1994, Western Cape prisoners expected a 
declaration of general amnesty. When this did not prevail, the Number gangs’ 
parliaments collectively ordered that the prisons be razed and burnt in revolt.150 This 
was done to maak die Nommer rond (making the number round – implying that 
causality must bring a logical conclusion).151 Number gangs exponents vehemently 
argued that they had fought for prisoners’ rights under the apartheid government: the 
argument contends that the new dispensation of 1994 negates the ‘liberation struggle’ 
within the prison fraternity and thus the advent of democracy in South Africa fails to 
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recognize the sacrifices and blood shed by the ‘soldiers’ in prisons in order to secure 
the very same democracy.152 This argument is contentious as it wholly relies upon 
the proposition that many, if not all non-white prisoners were jailed as a result of 
damning socio-cultural and political factors that mitigate their descent into criminal 
activity. Significantly, the Number gangs also argue that they fought to protect the 
rights and dignity of political prisoners who fought for democracy ‘outside’. The 
argument contends that the political prisoners would have been further victimized 
inside prison were it not for the opposition movement led by the Number gangs. The 
Number gangs fought for basic human rights that were absent from the apartheid 
prisons.153 Prison conditions were adverse (where prisoners were subjected to 
beatings, solitary confinement, food rationing, etc.) with prison staff having full 
autonomy to treat prisoners as they pleased, and this included living out their various 
racially motivated hatreds.154 The Number gangs assert that they are the liberation 
struggle’s abandoned soldiers who are still waiting to be acknowledged and, by 
conclusion, compensated.155  
 
Steinberg’s theory regarding the 1996 Flower Gang murders in the Namaqualand 
town of Niewoudville is an example of the degree of resilience that the Number 
gangs show in the face of possible extinction due to a changing administrative 
climate found in today’s South African prisons.156 The theory argues that an ndota 
with the 26s gang, nicknamed Doggy Dog, recruited a few non-members into the 27s 
gang. What is significant about this proposition is that the recruitment occurred 
outside prison (as examine earlier). Moreover, Doggy Dog was a 26 that converted 
himself into a 27 at the time so as to affect this new generation of 27s preaching the 
gospel of Nkilikijan. This type of transition inside the prison gang mythology sets a 
precedent and speaks to the dynamic ability of the prison gangs to reconstitute itself 
as a survival instinct. The act was done in the spirit of maak die Nommer vol (to 
make the Number complete- implying that it was prophetically done to strengthen the 
influence of the Number gangs). The Niewoudville murders engendered a symbolism 
suggesting that once obsolete Nkilikijan (the 27s) is alive again, the murders 
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representative of the Nongoloza mythology, and that the status quo still remains, that 
is, authorities are still operating according to their old ways ‘and that bandits are still 
bandits’.157   
 
My research aligns with this understanding that prison gangs exhibit an aggressive 
sense of collective identity when they are threatened. Just like a soldier does not 
abandon a post after securing a victory because a new dispensation has to be 
defended, exponents within the Number gangs argue that the gangs still operate 
because to secure the fragile democracy.158 Many disciples of the Number gangs 
assert that they can make prisons in South Africa ungovernable if conditions in 
prisons regress to their oppressive ways of old.159 Why do the Number gangs persist 
even though their previous aims have been realized (that is, if their proposition that 
they were ‘soldiers for the South African liberation’ is true)? Prisons have, at least 
according to legislation, become more human rights orientated and thus the struggle 
to make conditions in prisons better for prisoners is almost obsolete. Or is this just 
spin doctoring on the part of prison management? For this reason my thesis also 
comprehensively explores both legislative policy and prison administrative reform 
(or attempts at reform, at least) that impact upon prison gang dominance. As my 
interviewees were unable to elaborate on constitutional/policy reform that influenced 
prison management, my study is limited in that I can only engage with the proposed 
political bureaucracy and its administrative operations both pre- and post-apartheid 
and compare its efficacy I terms of meaningful change for individuals caught in the 
harsh South African prison landscape: 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MANAGERIAL INFLUENCES : 
Albeit that the various Number gangs dispute their respective origins within 
Nongoloza’s timeline, they all find congruency in the assertion that Nongoloza’s then 
circumstances dictated the path that he chose – he was forced into banditry because 
he, and many other young blacks like him, was disinherited from his ancestral land 
and forced to assimilate the identity of mine-workers by an oppressive and racist 
government. Did South Africa’s race laws engender a criminal culture within the 
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‘non-White’ demographic? Something must be said about the alarming numbers of 
young ‘Black’ men criminalized by race legislation and aimlessly wandering in and 
out of South African prisons in the early twentieth century. Sling Blade’s account is 
testament to this proposition as he too argued that he was trapped in South Africa’s 
political apparatus and ultimately savagely crippled by the debilitating nature of 
South African prison culture.160 The socio-economic and political factors, according 
to Sling Blade, gave him little or no choice but to pursue a criminal culture.  To this 
end, Steinberg correctly posits (as my research yields the same results) that South 
African prisons have ‘incubated a fiercely anti-colonial ideology.’161 This 
proposition is difficult to refute given the pervasive nature of the Number gangs, its 
substantial history and influence in South African prisons, and its militant doctrine 
that was born in response to discriminatory legislation and its subsequent unjust 
dispensations. Amidst the prevalent predatory behaviour elicited by the gangs, Sykes 
posits that gangs offer a meaningful response to the dislocation and dysfunction that 
imprisonment brings to individuals.162  
According to Lötter, some of the personal freedoms compromised by imprisonment 
include, inter alia, institutionalisation, boredom, loss of dignity, deprivation of goods 
and communication, powerlessness and even frustration due to sexual 
impoverishment.163 The spoils of criminal activity (flashy cars etc.) and the strong 
correlation between prison gangs and outside gangs also act as strong draw cards for 
previous inmates to stay engaged in the criminal economy.164 Perceived stereotypes 
also make assimilation into normal life difficult for prisoners who are set free. Since 
former prisoners are many times regarded with suspicion and contempt, prisoners 
and parolees alike argue that it becomes increasingly difficult for former prisoners to 
change and adapt when the world that they are assimilated into is unchanging and 
still intolerant of former prisoners.165 Many times, this leads to high recidivism rates 
and a significant plea for proactive re-integration programs becomes apparent. What 
is tragic is that many of the authors cited here found their conclusions up to 40years 
ago and, the fact that my research finds congruence with data from that timeline 
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implies that little or nothing has changed in terms of prison gang operations within 
the South African prison system. The paper thus examines the contentious and 
troubled prison reform ambitions and policies adopted by both management and 
government with the aim of attaining a more humanitarian, progressive, and 
ultimately rehabilitatory function within the South African prisons context:  
 
(1) South African ‘prison transformation’ 
The global escalation of reported crime, and particularly violent crime, has shifted a 
strong focus upon the criminal justice system in South Africa. The correctional 
system, an element of the criminal justice system, along with all state institutions in 
South Africa, was nurtured to serve the needs of the apartheid regime – characterised 
by racism, violence and critically without transparency and accountability.166 The 
new regime that was democratically elected in 1994 was faced with the 
insurmountable challenge of transforming these departments in accordance with 
successful international trends, and thus better services the needs of the fledgling 
democracy. In many areas, reform initiatives were set in motion, inter alia: 
demilitarisation, affirmative action implementation, civil society involvement in the 
correctional perimeter, and changes to health policy regarding HIV/AIDS 
sufferers.167 These drives have, however, been largely isolated and unplanned, and in 
addition, have been incomplete.168 There are many reasons for the difficulties 
experienced in realizing this transformation: barriers may be structural in nature 
(prison numbers crisis, overcrowding, sentencing policy, and the lack of co-
ordination between various criminal justice departments); others may be human 
factors, given the institutional culture and policy inherited from the apartheid 
legacy.169 Unless government confronts both structural and human obstacles head on, 
no significant transformation will be possible – inevitably thus enabling the Number 
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(2) A Wolf in Sheep’s Skin 
It becomes apparent that the post-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) 
government adopts a policy to increase long-term imprisonment in terms of its 
attitude toward prison administration (not unlike its predecessor the old National 
Party government), even though it (the ANC) proclaims humanitarian standards.170 
Clear argues that unlike its Northern counterparts (USA, much of Europe and many 
other Western democracies) who have adopted a prison reform policy where at least 
two or three inmates get given community supervision for every inmate confined, the 
chosen South African model appears in stark contrast where it is typical to find up to 
ten people incarcerated in ratio to a single parolee.171 Thus it can be argued that the 
new dispensation of 1994 did not simply eject the repressive administrative policies 
of old and replace them with a pro-active and human rights focussed regime, but 
instead embraced much of the old order and continued to build on its foundations. 
There is thus evidence of much management continuance that mirrors the ways of the 
old order, especially in the context of penal governance and Van Zyl Smit is accurate 
in his assessment when he posits that the history of the South African prison 
administration is a tale about both change and continuity.172 This is significant 
regarding the (mal)treatment of prisoners in South Africa as the parliaments of the 
Number gangs assert are more progressively oppositional stance in retaliation.173 The 
respective prison gangs are found to polarize against prison administration when they 
perceive a continuance of the ‘apartheid-styled’ prison administration apparatus, 
often viewing the ANC prison policies as the proverbial ‘wolf in sheep skin’.174 
 
The apartheid state was a paradigm that was a synergy of both repressive and liberal 
welfare, which privileged its ‘white’ citizens whereas the post-apartheid ANC-led 
government increased the limits of government institutions to have its citizenry 
include all people, thus disregarding race.175 This transition entailed a process that 
recalibrated these institutional reforms, including enterprise that added new 
institutions. Super argues that this stance was adopted due to adherence to the 
principles of actuarialism, responsibilization, risk, compassion and restoration that 
                                                
170  Ibid. 
171  Clear (2008) 32. 
172  Van Zyl Smit op cit (1) 102.  
173  All subjects interviewed confirmthis proposition. 
174  Ibid. 




can succeed to exist within a climate of blatantly repressive sovereign rule; the new 
dispensation can co-exist with the older techniques as the former are flexible and 
have the ability to adapt to diverse and contradictory contexts.176 When the ANC 
assumed power in 1994, they were (as an organization) ill prepared to deal with the 
increasing violent crime index, as they were a liberation organization that prior to 
1994 had little or no interest in everyday crimes; the ANC at the time were 
themselves focussed upon promoting ungovernability within the apartheid state.177 
Suddenly the ANC-led government had to be responsible for governing the South 
African nation, which included showing confidence in stemming rampant crime 
rates. Public outcry exposing corruption and increasing pressures due to prison 
misadministration all served to inflame perceptions that the new government had 
been able to fulfil its obligation to shield its citizenry from the negative impact of 
crime.178 In its wake, a paradox is exposed: as crime continues to flourish unabated, 
so more people are imprisoned and the issue prison overcrowding becomes more 
pertinent, yet the government continues its official position of embracing 
‘rehabilitation’ amidst its draconically harsh penal sanctions.179 How else is the new 
government, a former champion of freedom and liberty, able to justify its heavily 
punishment-orientated ‘prison is the solution’ orthodoxy other than to adopt a stance 
promoting ‘pseudo-rehabilitation’? Super asserts that there is a distinction between 
what is considered to be ‘democracy on paper’ and the numerous repressive policies 
and inequalities that are the hallmark of many officially democratic states; 
furthermore, whilst there is no denying that the prison system itself in no way 
represents freedom irrespective how empowering it is portrayed or how often it is 
‘re-legitimised’.180 It is accurate to cite Foucault in viewing this paradigm as ‘a 
constantly failing project’. The prison Number gangs are aware of this dysfunction as 
they live within the context that it supports. As with the harsh penality policies 
adopted by the apartheid regime, the Number gangs are fiercely oppositional to these 
trends and constantly evolve its (the Number gangs’) functions to assert power 
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against management in response. Thus government’s current stance is seen as 
inadvertently promoting prison gang dominance.181 
 
(3) Prison institutional reform 
The paper now brings the said ‘more-punitive than humanitarian’ policy adopted by 
the ANC under examination: 
Significant legal changes were initiated by the adoption of both the so-called interim 
Constitution of 1993 and the current ‘final’ Constitution in 1996, as South Africa 
became a constitutional democracy.  Detention without trial was abolished and both 
the Death sentence and corporal punishment were ruled unconstitutional by the 
newly established Constitutional Court.182 Both the interim and final Constitutions 
guaranteed general rights of human dignity, equality and liberty for all and also 
provided specifically for the protection of the rights of all detainees including 
sentenced prisoners. Section 35(2) of the 1996 Constitution provides: 
 
‘Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right – 
(a) To be fully informed of the reason for being detained; 
(b) To choose, and to consult with a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right 
promptly; 
(c) To have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state 
expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this 
right promptly; 
(d) To challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the 
detention is unlawful, to be released; 
(e) To conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least 
exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, 
reading matter and medical treatment; and 
(f) To communicate with, and be visited by, that person’s – 
i) Spouse or partner; 
ii) Next of kin; 
iii) Chosen religious counselor; and 
iv) Medical practitioner.’ 
  
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights must be interpreted against the background of 
international law. Section 39 of the Constitution provides specifically that 
consideration be given to international law, when the Bill of Rights is interpreted. 
This means that instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are constitutionally 
binding. The provisions relating to prisons are, however, very general. They have be 
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interpreted by relying on secondary instruments which, while not directly binding 
international law, can be used to interpret general provisions that provide for the 
treatment of prisoners with human dignity and outlaw cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.183 At an international level the 1955 United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners have been referred to by 
South African courts.184 In the African context the Kampala Declaration on Prison 
Conditions in Africa may be seen as supplementary to the African Charter. The 
policy environment during the period 1994-2002 was ascertained predominantly by 
the fact that, earlier, a standoff existed between the (ANC) chairperson of the 
Portfolio Committee and the (IFP).185 The debate regarding the nature of civil society 
involvement in correctional reform dissipated in the absence of ministerial 
commitment and Departmental reluctance to participate. It goes without saying that 
instability at management level over a prolonged period has significantly contributed 
to some of the challenges facing correctional policy and practice today.186  
 
Another step in the process of fundamentally changing the law and philosophy 
relating to imprisonment was the adoption of the new Correctional Services Act 111 
of 1998.187 The Act became law on 19 November 1998. Initially only a few 
provisions were brought into force, but since October 2004 the new Act has been 
fully in operation. This has led to many legal changes to the prison system, as the 
1998 Act aimed at incorporating the values enunciated in the Bill of Rights and at 
promoting a fresh approach to imprisonment.188 The 1998 emphasis of the rights and 
duties of prisoners rather than on the system required implementation. It provided 
that, while prisons are required to accept the authority of correctional officials, duties 
and restrictions must not be imposed on prisoners to a great extent and for a longer 
period than is necessary for the maintenance of security and good order.  Moreover, 
the minimum rights relating to matters such as accommodation, hygiene, clothing 
and bedding, exercise, health care, contact with the community, and religion, belief 
and opinion, may not be violated for disciplinary or any other purposes.189 Even 
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though these provisions are legally entrenched, my research argues that prisoners’ 
rights are still continually violated. The Number gangs’ opposition to 
unconstitutional prison practices continues to grow (as does its influence) while the 
government drives its hidden agenda of ‘imprisonment is the solution’ versus its 
public policy of quasi-humanitarian reform.190 
 
(4) Demilitarisation and implementation flaws: 
The law, however, does not operate in a vacuum: hence one should examine what 
impact the new legislation had on the DCS and how it transformed generally in the 
past decade. The DCS is an independent government department: at the head is the 
Minister of Correctional Services, followed by the Commissioner of Correctional 
Services who reports directly to him and is the accounting officer for the Department 
as a whole. In the past the DCS was organised on fully military lines with the 
Commissioner holding the substantive rank of general, but in April 1996 this was 
changed.191 With the decision to demilitarize came the undertaking that not only 
were military ranks abolished but also that only custodial staff continued to wear 
uniforms. This process paid scant regard to the outcry over the new bright orange 
prisoner garb that has the word ‘prisoner’ branded all over it. In late 2004 three 
prisoners who alleged that the uniform was an infringement of their constitutional 
right to dignity brought an application before the Johannesburg High Court.192 A new 
civilian character to the DCS was on the department’s primary agenda.193 This was 
premised in the culmination of a growing realisation of the need to portray a more 
coherent corporate identity. Poor communication of the new policy, combined with 
shoddy implementation and an apparent lack of contingency planning catalysed great 
resistance to this flawed process of demilitarisation.194 The change was not 
unproblematic, as the staff as a whole had to adjust to a different way of exercising 
authority without much re-training. A measure of disruption was probably inevitable, 
however, as a modification in the manner of interaction between staff and prisoners 
made it harder to maintain order. Whilst the demilitarisation was necessary to change 
the culture, the manner in which it was done and the pace with which it was 
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implemented left members confused and unprepared to deal with colleagues or 
prisoners under the newly introduced structure.195  
 
The demilitarisation process coincided with a substantial affirmative action campaign 
(aimed to transform the staff corps), which rolled out without due planning and 
consideration of the training and development needs of the affirmed appointees.196 
This led to a situation where officials, who were also facing militant trade unionism 
amongst prison officers for the first time, were not capable of disciplining junior 
officials because they have not been trained in how to deal with the demands of the 
new situation. This then resulted in a great deal of tension, unhappiness and a decline 
in morale of the members, which in turn caused general instability in the DCS.197 
Staff disciplinary procedures had to be redefined, for example, and laxity in 
implementing disciplinary procedures for infringement continues to plague the 
correctional arena.198 Prisoners, being an integral part of this entire process, were 
affected by every shift within the prison administration and staged various protests as 
their world became less predictable. My research confirms that much of the new 
recruitment strategies adopted by the Number gangs were implemented during this 
period so as to consolidate and mobilize against the prison administration. Again, it 
could be argued in such an instance that dysfunctional policy implementation 
unintentionally enables the influence and pervasiveness of the Number gangs. 
  
(5) A white paper to resolve the crisis? 
The aforementioned crisis in the administration was exacerbated by the absence of a 
clear vision and sound, consistent leadership. Recently the DCS has attempted to 
form a long-term strategic vision (policy) for the correctional system in the country 
by issuing a White Paper (2005) that is aimed at outlining the way forward for prison 
services in the country and replaces the hastily adopted White Paper of 1994.199 After 
nearly two decades of democracy, the DCS is still trying to move away from its 
military structure that emphasised the safe custody of prisoners to an approach that 
focuses strongly on the rehabilitation of prisoners. The 2005 White Paper thus 
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significantly overcomes the lack of vision and coherence of the 1994 White Paper by 
setting an agenda for transformation of the correctional sphere so as to at least 
endeavour to infuse safe custody with the ideal of rehabilitation.200 The White Paper 
is also frank about the challenges and obstacles prevalent in its quest to attaining the 
high goals it sets. Notably, the White Paper focussed not only on external factors 
such as overcrowding, but also internal hurdles such as inappropriate organisational 
culture and poor staffing skills.201 The reality however, is that the increasing numbers 
of those incarcerated continues to overwhelm both available space and planned 
future space; overcrowding may present itself to be a substantial barrier to the 
achievement of the ideals of the 2005 White Paper.202 The White Paper becomes an 
idealistic mirage in light of ongoing corruption and human rights violations within 
prisons.203 A transformation of the prison sub-culture demands not only law and 
policy reform, it demands dedicated leadership and sustained management. The Jali 
Commission exposed gross misadministration in South African prisons and such lack 
of transparency and accountability showed prisoners to be vulnerable and said little 
for the rule of law in South Africa.204 As earlier mentioned, these factors affect the 
administration of prisons and thus motivate Number gangs’ parliaments to mobilize 
against prison authorities.  
 
(6) Trade unions: 
A factor that has had bearing on the implementation of policy and transformation 
regarding prisons is unionism. After 1994 it became necessary that the DCS comply 
with the constitutional principles and norms enunciated in the Interim Constitution 
also in respect of labour matters.205 The transformation of the DCS, in this respect, 
focussed on recognising trade unionism and on introducing affirmative action to 
change the racial composition of the prison staff, in particular of those in senior 
management positions (Section 9 of Interim Constitution gave all workers the right 
to join trade unions). The unions’ management are met with challenges that their 
predecessors did not face in more repressive times.206 The Number gangs, initially 
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confused by the demilitarisation process, soon become optimistic as the staff 
transformed from a ‘White’ face to a more familiar one. The confidence in the 




Previously, all prison staff were found under the direct employ of a single national 
department. This changed, however, when a policy decision was taken to privatize 
some prisons. The commissioning of privately constructed and managed prisons was 
influenced by the practice of the United States, and the preference of the then 
Minister (Mzimela) for correctional policies from those areas.208 The policy provided 
for so-called joint venture prisons, which allowed the private sector to build and to 
manage, and therefore also to staff such prisons.209  A key objective was to alleviate 
overcrowding through more rapid construction of facilities – the private sector would 
finance the costs of design and erection of the buildings in the short term, with the 
government repaying both capital and management costs over a substantial period of 
time. This move was controversial as detractors argued that importing new ideas 
form abroad would lead to complications as those countries themselves battled with 
prison overcrowding, especially in the USA.210 Mauer argues that contemporary the 
American society should not as much be concerned about whether or not the prison 
system is good, but rather focus on whether it is wise to expand its already world 
record sized prison population.211 Two such prisons, however, were procured by the 
Department of Public Works on behalf of the Department, using private-sector 
capital and expertise for their finance design, construction, operations and 
maintenance. The first privately operated prison was the Mangaung Security Prison 
near Bloemfontein. The second to be built was the Kutama Sinthumele Maximum 
Prison in Limpopo.212 A legislative framework was created for them, which includes 
provision for the appointment of ‘custodial officers’ who are in the employ of private 
companies rather than the state.  
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The international controversy surrounding the privatization of prisons 
notwithstanding, the South African context begged questions of cost almost 
immediately after the ink dried.213 This would indicate continued ambivalence as to 
what actual costs are (excluding capital repayments) what affordability should be, 
and whether the cake is proverbially worth the candle – supposing that rehabilitation 
is more achievable in private prison settings. The implications of the move toward 
privitisatization have been controversial to say the least – the process has generated 
increasing complaints of human rights violations from the prisoner 
populations.214Moreover, the prison gangs were complaining that they were being 
targeted and unfairly victimized, and this set the premise for a ‘powder keg ready to 
blow’ scenario between gangs and administration, notably at the Manguang prison 
facility.215 The details of this debacle follow. 
 
 
Subsequent privitization flaws: 
The Manguang Security Prison came under fire in 2013 when reports were rife that 
clashes between the various Number gangs had escalated to such a level that alleged 
torture and abuse were being employed by its prison administration as a means to 
subdue ‘hardened’ prisoners at the model private prison.216 In 2000, the DCS entered 
into a public private partnership (PPP) with the British-Danish partner security firm 
‘G4S’ to build, manage and monitor the Mangaung prison. The prison opened in 
2001 and was designed with a holding capacity of approximately 3000 to cater for 
predominantly maximum security and long term prisoners.217  In 2013 the Manguang 
Prison was spotlighted when prisoners alleged that the facility was more of a torture 
institute than a rehabilitation centre.218 The Mangaung prison has been rocked by 
violent stabbings, riots and at least three hostage takings in September 2013. Reports 
confirm that 331 warders were dismissed for participation in an unprotected 
strike.219The said warders demanded the reinstatement of two dismissed POPCRU 
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shop stewards. G4S replaced the dismissed warders with uncertified staff, one of 
whom was taken hostage by prisoners.220 Shortly thereafter, the DCS investigated the 
situation and temporarily took over the management of the Manguang prison facility. 
The DCS acting national commissioner argued that they (the DCS) found G4S to 
have lost effective control of the facility and therefore DCS was forced to take over. 
G4S has a 25 year contract with DCS to manage the Manguang Prison. According to 
G4S management, they (G4S) have invested millions in the contract and maintain 
that they were in control of the contract.221G4S further assert that they asked for 
DCS’s help. According to the contract, G4S has to uphold a minimum standards 
protocol and they are fined if these standards are compromised. If they provide the 
minimum standards, DCS pays G4S a fee linked to inflation. The contract also 
allows for fines attributed to non-compliance or the breach of specifications. 
According to DCS, G4S was fined R1.4 million for the recent violence that erupted 
on its [G4S’s] watch in August 2013.  G4S’s Emergency Support Team (EST) is 
commonly called “Ninjas” at Manguang Prison. These ‘Ninjas’ are alleged to use 
torture through, inter alia, electric shock methods, extreme isolation, solitary 
confinement methods, and applying force to subdue prisoners while privately 
contracted medical staff administer psychotropic drugs injected involuntarily into 
prisoners.222 Drug injections are alleged to be used to subdue and alter the behavior 
of troublesome prisoners.  Reports argue that prisoners felt symptomatically 
depressed or suicidal after forced drugs were administered.223 G4S maintains that it 
operates within strict accordance of the standard operational procedures and 
governing legislation as prescribed by DCS and the South African Constitution. The 
maladministration debacle has left prison gangs polarized and almost militantly 
defiant against all management at Manguang; another example of reinforced gang 
behavior.224  
  
(8) Unit management:  
Van Zyl Smit argues that prison over-population has reached critical capacity to the 
degree that even the most effectively administered and organized South African 
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prison will fail to comply with the conditions for prisoner treatment as set out by the 
Constitution.225 Moreover, if this increase continues unabated, the overcrowded 
prison population and its subsequent negative social effects threaten to feature 
prominently and permanently within the South African socio-economic and political 
landscape.226 Mauer echoes this sentiment when he asserts that mass incarceration is 
socially detrimental in that it engenders human rights infringements and racial 
polarization.227 
Another factor that caused a major philosophical shift in managing and transforming 
South African prisons is the adoption of a unit management system.228 The 
American-inspired idea is that prisons must be largely decentralized by dividing the 
prisons population into small manageable entities. It is claimed that in this way 
significantly more effective development and rehabilitation services can be rendered.  
The success of unit management depends to a large extent on a physical environment 
that allows small groups to be established and dealt with in terms of the new 
philosophy.229 It has major implications for prison design: the new philosophy is 
being implemented in the designs of new prisons that have recently been built and 
that are now on the drawing board.230 Although the White Paper patently has unit 
management as a cornerstone of its overall grand design, the existing South African 
prison cell infrastructure provides an entirely antithetical environment for its 
implementation.231 Whether it can be applied also to existing overcrowding prisons 
designed with a different philosophy in mind is a question that needs to be answered. 
Moreover, it is alarming that prisons, punishment, and rehabilitation remains an 
under-researched field in South Africa while crucial law and policy ratifications were 
enforced in this grossly misunderstood landscape.232 As prison overcrowding is a 
crucial factor in prisoner co-existence and subsequent violence (which inadvertently 
forms part of Number gangs’ influence), possible solutions to the problem (such as 
unit management) must be carefully strategized and cautiously implemented.233 
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(9) Maximum Isolation 
Another contentious aspect of the South African prison system has been the 
development of maximum-security prisons. The Number gangs have been shown to 
oppose harsh prison conditions. Thus the introduction of maximum security prisons, 
with its accompanying punitive sanctions has had its fair share of prisoner opposition 
and protests regarding victimization and human rights violations.234 Inter alia solitary 
confinement protocols that are employed at the maximum security prisons were 
contested as being unconstitutional.235 The first such prison, known as ‘C-Max’, was 
installed in part of Pretoria Central Prison in 1997. Only sentenced prisoners with a 
maximum-security classification, who are mainly problematic cases or regarded as 
dangerous, and trial awaiting prisoners with a high escape risk are incarcerated at 
Pretoria C-Max Prison.236 Other maximum-security units have subsequently been 
opened too. There has been no scientific study of conditions in these maximum 
prisons but journalistic accounts suggest their regimes are closely modelled on 
American maximum-security units237. Criticism has been of two kinds. First, it has 
been suggested that the regimes amount to ‘de facto’ segregation, without the legal 
criteria for segregation necessarily being applicable to the prisoners housed there.238 
This, it is argued, is particularly unfair to prisoners who are awaiting trial or those 
that might be selected because of the notoriety of their crimes rather than the security 
risk they present.239 The authorities deny this criticism and claim that all the 
prisoners are there because of the security risk they present and that the regime is 
tailored to this risk.240 Secondly, it is argued that the expense of maintaining these 
units is not justified in an under-funded system and that the money could better be 
spent on the many prisoners who demonstrably require assistance if the prison 
experience is to be positive in any way. Van Zyl Smit argues that the introduction of 
the new C-Max prisons engenders an institutional threat in that it is being employed 
as an informal means of ‘internal punishment’ to circumvent the statutory discipline 
system with its accompanying oversight commissions.241  
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The 1998 Act provides strict rules for segregated detention (Section 25 deals with 
solitary confinement while section 30 of the 1998 Act deals with segregation). It is 
clear that such detention should be used sparingly and that it should be controlled. 
Whether the Department will succeed in using it as an exception rather than norm 
remains to be seen. Segregated detention may be akin to solitary confinement.  Its 
practical effect on inmates may be very harsh and may even constitute a 
constitutionally forbidden form of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.242 
 
In terms of s 24(5)(d) of the 1998 Act, solitary confinement, properly so-called, for a 
period not exceeding thirty (30) days may be imposed in the case of serious or 
repeated infringements. The 1998 Act, however, makes provision for some 
safeguards in the event that prisoners who are placed in solitary confinement are not 
abused. Section 25(1) provides: 
‘A penalty of solitary confinement must be referred to the Inspecting Judge for 
review.  The Inspecting Judge must, within three (3) days, after considering the 
records of the proceedings and a report from a registered nurse, psychologist or the 
medical officer, on the health status of the prisoner concerned, confirm or set aside 
the decision or penalty and substitute an appropriate order for it.’ 
 
 The danger is that segregated detention may amount to a form of solitary 
confinement without the necessary safeguards being in place to monitor and limit its 
imposition and implementation.243The Number gangs’ parliaments are vigilantly 
monitored where such segregated detention occurs as their agendas are usually 
combined in an attempt to polarize opposition against prison authorities.244In such 
instances, attempts at taking the lives of prison staff are rife and the respective 
Number gangs’ parliaments collude to remain influential so as to inform better living 
conditions for all prisoners.245 
 
(10) Custodial partnerships: 
Garces et al. assert that informal prison dynamics within the post-colonial 
framework continue to have a profound influence on prison administrative practices, 
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more especially on the African and South American continents. 246 It is argued that 
alarming prison population explosions coupled with pleas for human rights reform in 
such countries offer little insight into the power base yielded by the ‘informal inmate 
authority’ and the resultant lack of efficacy in implementing relevant and 
humanitarian penal reform. Furthermore, Garces et al. posit that the staff-inmate 
opposition that defines the penal administrative character in Northern countries 
(where security-based technological structures are implemented to facilitate their 
bureaucratic function) is contrary to their Southern counterparts who, even when 
implementing the same technological contexts aimed at attaining prison reform, are 
unable to function in a meaningful manner without mutual staff-inmate dependencies 
and situational adjustments. 247 These contexts show that prisoner authority is part 
and parcel of the prison governance. This trend is important in understanding the 
powerbase yielded by the South African Number gangs’ in instances where the 
prison administration is forced to partner certain managerial tasks (eg cleaning, food 
teams etc) with the Number gangs in an attempt to elicit effective and efficient 
operation of such prison facilities.248 
 
As it stands, human rights jurisprudence is oppositional to prisoner self-governance, 
the illegal exploitation of captive labour, and ‘contraband economies’, but at the 
same time dynamic security remains a prison administrative concept that promotes 
the idea of staff-inmate communications and relations instead of the institutionally 
cold walls, locks and security scanners that distance staff from the prison climate.249 
This new staff-inmate collaborative design is gaining popularity with both prison 
staff and inmates alike as it also promotes the opportunity for identity adjustment in 
that prisoners are now seen as counsellors, teachers, and prison-representatives 
instead of being slandered as ‘post-colonial convict-guards’.250All my subjects 
confirm that such collaborations tend to empower prisoners and, in some way, enable 
a degree of dignity in an environment that is known to institutionally leave prisoners 
(collectively) bereft of such personal affirmation. 
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(11) Medical dilemma: 
Medical treatment of prisoners in South Africa remains a controversial issue.  It also 
reflects on the role of policy and the impact of transformation on service delivery. 
Some of the controversy centres on the detail of how the constitutional right (which 
every prisoner is due) to ‘adequate medical treatment’ has been developed in 
legislation.  Particularly controversial is s 12(1) of the 1998 Act provides:   
 
‘The Department must provide, within its available resources, adequate health care 
services, based on the principle of primary health care in order to allow every 
prisoner to lead a healthy life.’ 
 
In this context health care is a wider concept than medical treatment, which, s 12(2) 
specifies, must be provided with the only qualification that no prisoner is entitled to 
cosmetic treatment at state expense.  What is problematic about s 12(1) is the double 
qualification of the right to health care. On the one hand, this is limited to primary 
health care, which is arguably justifiable as in a poor country the state cannot afford 
to provide comprehensive health care to all its citizens and must perforce limit what 
it offers to primary intervention such as the prevention of infectious diseases through 
vaccination. The further qualification that even primary health care must be provided 
only within the available resources of the department goes too far, however. One 
consolation is that, if primary health care were to be restricted significantly because 
of a lack of resources, a court would be able to hold that the resultant conditions of 
detention would be an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental right to 
detention in conditions of human dignity. 
 
The right to medical treatment has been controversial for the opposite reason, namely 
that prisoners are afforded treatment that is not available to private citizens.251 In 
prison law the leading case in this regard is the decision in Van Biljon v. Minister of 
Correctional Services in which the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court 
ruled that a prisoner’s constitutional right to adequate medical treatment meant that 
expensive anti-viral therapy had to be provided for an AIDS sufferer.252 The Court 
explained that although the state did not provide such therapy for indigent free 
people this did not mean that it did not have to do so for prisoners. Prisoners had no 
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access to alternative sources of income to finance their treatment and the state had a 
duty to prisoners, which it did not have to all citizens. This contrast was highlighted 
by a decision of the Constitutional Court, which held that the state did not have a 
duty to find the resources for expensive kidney dialysis for a free person who would 
die if it were not provided.253 
 
Much controversy was engendered by the questions as to whether the increase in 
natural deaths is attributable to HIV and AIDS and how the spread of AIDS in prison 
should be prevented.254 Current policy is that prisoners may only be tested for HIV 
with their informed consent. Prisoners who are known to be HIV positive or to have 
AIDS are not automatically segregated from other prisoners. Instead, reliance is 
placed on education and making condoms available to prisoners in order to prevent 
the spread of the disease.255 In these circumstances figures will not reflect the actual 
number of cases.   
 
The plight of prisoners who are HIV positive and their lack of access to medical 
treatment have remained under the spotlight since 2005. In the case of Magida vs. 
The State, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that conditions in prison are such that 
there is an increased risk of being exposed to opportunistic infections due to 
overcrowding and inadequate diet.256 The court indicated that the state of health of 
the accused must be taken into account as a relevant consideration in imposing an 
appropriate sentence. It is anticipated that the judgment will place increased 
challenges on the Department to ensure that HIV/AIDS policies are in place. 
Although the White Paper outlines that the DCS should focus on programmes to 
reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases to allow people 
under correction to leave the system as healthy as possible, a review of the DCS’s 
policies on health and the cases which reflect the reality of the services delivery 
show that there is yet a long way to go before this crucial health issue is dealt with 
adequately by the DCS.257 As the Number gangs legitimize both violence and sexual 
violence as an institutional part of prison life in its daily operations, it is important 
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that the respective policies are carefully and effectively instituted by prison 
authorities.258 The DCS must prioritise medical care for prisoners, especially in the 
South African context where prisoners are without adequate defence from violence 
(including sexual violence that could lead to AIDS) in the hostile environments that 
they are trapped in. 
 
(12) Stunted transformation and the endorsement of violence: 
Gear argues that the prevailing male inmate populations in South African prisons, 
more especially the powerful Number gangs, all support prison rape and by extension 
endorse long-term relationships that are based upon sexual violence. 259 The prison 
gangs are thus instrumental in the socialisation of the prison culture and they attain 
this by legitimising inmate violence and by indoctrinating inmate populations into 
accepting that such violent relationships are normal as they mimic heterosexual 
marriages. When the gangs mirror a society’s prescriptions of both gender and 
sexuality, they force prison cultures into believing that a man becomes a woman 
when he is raped in prison and he is thereafter treated (‘cared for’) like wife/bride or 
‘wyfie’. 260  Thus far, the DCS and its staff have failed to curtail or even 
meaningfully engage with the pervasive nature of prison violence, and have also 
been unable to provide much needed support structures for the many casualties of 
prison violence.261 The DCS’s official position regarding prison sexual violence has 
been both inconsistent and without commitment, if referenced by its policy shifts and 
actions (or lack thereof). Since the new dispensation in 1994 the DCS has initiated 
numerous failed policies and initiatives aimed at prison reform and more especially 
focussed upon attending to the alarming casualization of inmate sexual violence. 
These drives have however been continually marred various institutional and 
transformational issues, including leadership and personnel shuffles, distorted 
commitments to objectives by succeeding leaderships, red tape, restructuring 
glitches, an inability to assign due diligence to pertinent issues, and a consistent lack 
of follow through when critical issues are ear-marked for closure.262 In many 
instances, DCS staff are left to use their own initiative in an attempt to address 
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inmate violence, without guiding policy or framework from DCS management as 
evidenced by the Correctional Services Act (1998) which fails to mention sexual 
violence.263 Resultant DCS staff grievances thus include a distinct lack of both 
executive prioritisations of the sexual violence issue, and of no clear referenced 
framework to make perpetrators accountable for their actions and at the same time 
offer support and protection for victims of these heinous offences.264 As a 
consequence, the pervasive violence in South African prisons fails to get the 
immediate attention that it requires and the DCS is overwhelmed in its failure to 
protect its prison populations from sexual violence and victimization, moreover it 
fails in its executive obligation to keep prisoners safe. Another astounding 
inconsistency in DCS policy is that its data gathering systems has no categorization 
for rape/sexual assault and subsequently whenever a male prisoner is raped it is 
documented as an ‘assault’.265 Gear posits that anecdotal proof yielded from 
workshops and meetings with prison staff reveal a trend to perceive forced sexual 
encounters between prisoners as being consensual.266 Consensual sex is not 
differentiated from sexual violence. This is problematic for DCS staff as they 
become inept in assessing consensual sex from sexual violence and this inability to 
categorize different sexual behaviours amongst the inmate population is the result of 
an apparent lack of functional policy and framework from management. Thus the 
DCS complaints registry for inmates is further beleaguered and proven to be 
inconsistent in assessing serious and sensitive complaints, leaving prisoners to regard 
it with apathy, sceptiscm and disdain. Although men that are raped are now 
recognised in South African law under the Criminal Law (Sexual offences and 
related matters) Amendment Act of 2007, Gear argues that this legislation fails to 
provide substantial clarity regarding sexual violence in prison contexts. 267 In its 
design to stem sexual violence in South African prisons, the DCS needs to 
implement an all-encompassing program that can be pro-active in both prevention 
and succeed in the context-related response when such offences occur. A very 
important consideration for any policy or framework development is the prevailing 
socio-cultural dynamics in prison anthropologies and the subsequent contexts that 
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both sculpt and motivate sexual violence. Gear asserts that this is fertile ground for 
the DCS to pioneer the reformation of prison culture by challenging oppressive 
ideologies of masculinity that make respect contingent upon violence, in the same 
breath it denies the right for men to express vulnerability, and this in turn engenders 
prison violence that perpetuates itself beyond the confines of prison and devastates 
our very society. 268 
 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Germany’s Prison Act stipulates that prison administration should be informed by 3 
principles:  
(1) Life in prison should as far as possible, reflect the general relationships of the outside 
world,  
(2) Administrators should work to limit the damaging effects of prison, and 
(3) The administration of prison is to be aimed at assisting the prisoners to adapt to a life of 
freedom.269  
 
Prison reform initiatives should include larger constituencies and must endeavour to 
embrace a problem solving approach regarding crime instead of one that is 
punitive.270 Reform policy should express a more optimistic view of public safety 
and be less reliant on repressive or punitive response. Strategies should provide 
communities with the necessary resources that will engender strong families and a 
stable citizenry. Restorative justice initiatives should be ratified so as to take into 
account the plight of both the victim and the offender. The model used in Norway 
and the Netherlands seems an attractive option: prisoners are put on a waiting list, 
much the same as one used in hospitals so as to avoid prison overcrowding271. Such a 
system may, however, undermine the legitimacy of the judicial authority and thus 
receive hostile response from the courts and the public. The lengthening of sentences 
for serious crimes is a direct cause of prison overcrowding. Garland272 asserts that 
societies that espouse mass imprisonment develop pathology where imprisonment 
serves to incarcerate not individuals, but entire population groups instead – a political 
agenda is deployed. The DCS should become accountable to its statutory and 
constitutional obligations by securing medical, nutritional, and human rights related 
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rights to prisoners. The government is obligated to fulfill its constitutional 
commitment to protect and advocate the rights of the entire citizenry. To this end, the 
government must design opportunities for offenders to attain their full potential 
through the ratification of prison services and administration.  It is possible to make 
South African prisons compliant with the tenets of the Constitution, but that 
meaningful transformation can only happen when law and policy reform adheres 
































The Number gangs provide a tragic and potent gauge by which to assess why so 
many non-white South African men lived devastatingly violent lives in the past, and 
why many more generations will follow in their footsteps, irrespective of the 
democratic underpinnings or lack thereof. The prison gangs embrace a fierce anti-
colonial sentiment and are disturbingly pathological. This violent doctrine is 
deliberate in its execution as it presents an enigmatic paradox: the quest for social 
equality and regeneration versus an almost blatant disdain for social order. The 
inherited legacy of apartheid has crippled the process of transformation in the South 
African correctional system. This study’s ultimate aim was to provoke more research 
into the compelling influence of South Africa’s prison Number gangs. In so doing, I 
hoped that it would also generate a greater understanding of a people and South 
African nation that struggles to define itself amidst a history that is rooted in a 
pervasive attempt to keep its citizens segregated from one another. A multi-pronged 
approach is needed to enable the way to developing a socially inclusive South 
African citizenry that is so blatantly necessary. Prison overcrowding still remains an 
overwhelming problem and the numbers appear likely to increase. Scarcity of 
resources and the unfettered power of gangs in most prisons prioritize the need for 
urgent action. DCS’s few successes, among them, commitment to affirmative action 
implementation and a decision to separate HIV prisoners are in themselves aligned to 
the Department’s shortcomings, e.g. affirmative action policy being unevenly 
implemented and generating some labor unrest at local level. Failures of the DCS are 
seated in structural reasons that involve inter alia a lack of resources, pressure from 
the public on the government to be tougher on crime, and an inherent lack of 
coordination in the criminal justice system as a whole. More subjective or human 
factors such as embracing a police officer culture also heavily influence the failed 
transformation. The distinct lack of humanitarianism becomes apparent despite the 
façade that such decency is being prioritized. A reluctance to develop a 
transformational plan, authorities preferring instead to leave major decisions at the 
discretion of leadership eschews civil participation in the process. Effective reform 
and transformation demands a redirection of resources and a fundamental 
restructuring of the management corps at all levels. Economic, social and political 
change in South Africa should first and foremost aim to improve and transform the 




promote the participation in the political process. Development (and the social 
policies implemented in its name) should aim to address the dilemma of distributive 
justice, and advance the cause of equality. This would proactively combat crime at 
street level instead of pushing out reactionary policy, which extends into all spheres 
including prison reform.	  Is prison transformation the remedy to disjunctions within 
the prisoner population? Will this have meaningful impact upon the already failing 
criminal justice system, and inadvertently give new premise for hope for a unified 
and crime free South Africa? The answer quite simply stated is “No”. To fix the state 
of affairs that burden DCS asks more than just policy reform – it demands a redesign 
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1. How long have you been involved with gangs? 
2. Are you currently affiliated with any particular gang? 
3. Give me your understanding of why young men turn to gang activity? 
4. What factors in your life, in your opinion, contributed to you becoming involved 
with gangs? 
5. Is/Was your father an active part of your life? 
6. Tell me about your experiences with drugs or alcohol. 
7. Tell me about your earliest experiences of violence. 
8. How did this affect your life? 
9. Tell me about your experience regarding gang-related violence. 
10.  Tell me of your life in gangs, detailing your initiation and your current position. 
11.  Tell me of your experiences in prison. 
12.  Tell me of your experience with prison gangs. Detail its origins and your initiation 
into the gang. 
13.  In your opinion, how has the demilitarization strategy and prison reform affected 
prison gang dynamics? 
14.  Do you have children? 
15.  How are they affected by your choices? 
16.  Tell me about contraband and how it is administered in prison. 
17.  Tell me about any links between gangs inside and outside of prison. 
18.  What, in your opinion, is the solution to the crime dilemma in South Africa? 
19.  How do you feel speaking about your role in gang activity? 
20.  How do you feel after telling me about such gruesome acts of violence? 
21.  What do you think is the motivation behind prison gangs/gangs outside? 
22.  Tell me about your tattoos. 
23. How would you feel if one of your children followed your path regarding gangs? 
24. How has (your) gang activity affected your family? 
25.  Tell me about prison corruption/maladministration, specifically regarding gangs. 
26.  Tell me about police corruption regarding gangs. 
 
 
